The Anatomy of Public Corruption

Remington Products Company, Playtex CEO Dale Ratliff, Matt Ratliff, Mitch Ratliff a truly unusual story

The Untimely Fate of Dale Ratliff 

The Dubious Phone Call and Time Wasting Project
The folks at TPG will have to answer to my Whistleblower Complaints on the truly odd collection of RFPs emanating from companies connected to Richard Blum, William McGlashan, CBRE, Regency Centers, Trammell Crow, Lennar, Catellus,

Bennett v. Southern Pacific Contra Costa County (1987)
My story is about witness murders, private equity, mergers and acquisitions linked back to the Matter of Bennett v. Southern Pacific lost in 1989.  It was a winnable case as long the witnesses testified.  

Southern Pacific General Counsel
Richard Stanford Kopf 
From 1972 to 1996
The defense representing Southern Pacific Transportation in the above matter used a variety of tactics to destroy Mr. Pete Bennett's successful business of custom commercial casework a small shop founded in the early 1980s 

Santa Fe Industries (controlled by Philip Anschutz) created subsidiaries (Land, Rail, Pipelines, Telecommunications)  > Santa Fe Southern Pacific created Southern Pacific Pipeline Partners (1991) was to Enron Corp (Ken Lay, Richard Morgan, Andrew Fastow, Jeffery Skiller)

Enron Corp (controlled by Ken Lay, Richard Morgan, Andrew Fastow, Jeffery Skiller) who created subsidiaries by (Andrew Fastow, Jeffery Skiller)


Alamo 1st Ward Alamo CA
Richard Stanford Kopf 
During the mid-90s after years of paying off debts from the manifested failure of Mainframe Designs Cabinets and Fixtures.

Remington Products Company, L.L.C.


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Wilson Cobbold Bennett father of Peter Carver Bennett was senior sales for Continental Can Company (CCC)

Wilson Cobbold Bennett father of Peter Carver Bennett was senior sales for Continental Can Company (CCC)

The Dubious Phone Call and Time Wasting Project
The folks at TPG will have to answer to my Whistleblower Complaints on the truly odd collection of RFPs emanating from companies connected to Richard Blum, William McGlashan, CBRE, Regency Centers, Trammel. Crow, Lennar, Catellus.

My story is about witness murders, private equity, mergers and acquisitions linked back to the Matter of Bennett v. Southern Pacific lost in 1989.  It was a winnable case as long the witnesses testified.  

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Continental Can Company

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Continental Can Company (CCC) was an American producer of metal containers and packaging company, that was based in Stamford, Connecticut.[1]
The Continental Can Company was founded by Edwin Norton[2] T.G. Cranwell in 1904,[3] three years after the formation of its greatest rival, American Can Company.[3]Continental acquired the patents of United Machinery Company, one of the few companies producing can-making machinery that had not been bought by American Can. CCC began shipping product in 1905.[3]
During World War II, Continental Can Company helped the war effort by building aircraft parts and bombs in their manufacturing plants.[3] The United Steelworkers of America was the union representing hundreds of manufacturing workers at Continental Can Company.[3]
In 1956, CCC acquired the Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, the third largest producer of glass containers, which led to the United States v. Continental Can Co. Supreme Court ruling in 1964.

History[edit]

The company bought the Standard Tin Plate Company in 1909 to ensure that they would have a steady supply of tin. Continental's original business consisted only of packers' cans for fruits and vegetables. Given the seasonal nature of this work, the company decided to expand to general canning in 1912. By 1913 the company had acquired all of the interests of a New Jersey corporation also called Continental Can Co., as well as the Export & Domestic Can Co. and the Standard Tin Plate Co. The same year, Continental was incorporated in the state of New York.[3]
During the 1920s Continental expanded rapidly, purchasing almost twenty competing companies. It opened its first West Coast plant in 1926. In 1928 Continental acquired the third-largest can company in the country, the United States Can Company. By 1934 Continental and its rival, American Can, were producing approximately two-thirds of the 10 million cans made annually in the country. At this time, the company was operating thirty-eight plants in the United States and Cuba. Continental suffered a drop in its income during the Depression; even so, by 1932 the company had never reported a money-losing year.[3]
By the mid-1930s, with 38 plants nationwide, the company employed about 1,800 men and 1,200 women around the Chicago area.[2]
Continental bounced back from the Depression years, and by 1940 its operating revenue had increased to $120.7 million from $80.9 million in 1935. In 1940 the company built plants in Canada as well. Continental continued to expand during the following decade through acquisitions, and the company entered the fields of paper and fiber containers, bottle caps, and synthetic resins. By the end of the 1940s, the company had sixty-five plants, including eight plants producing fiber and paper containers, four plants producing crown caps, and one plant producing plastics. By 1954 the company's gross sales reached $616 million, and its net income was approximately $21 million. At that time, Continental was operating eighty-one plants.[3]
During the company's first fifty years of existence, it had purchased and absorbed twenty-eight independent can companies, as well as other concerns producing fiber drums, paper containers, and bottle tops. In 1956 Continental acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., the third-largest U.S. manufacturer of glass containers. Continental then became the first company with a full line of containers in metal, paper, and glass. It also purchased Cochrane Foil Company, a manufacturer and distributor of aluminum plates and rigid foil packages for the frozen-food industry and other food suppliers. The company also bought Robert Gair Company, a leading producer of paperboard products, that same year. Due to such acquisitions, Continental briefly surpassed American Can's annual sales, topping $1 billion in 1957. By 1960 the company operated 155 plant facilities.[3]
The introduction of the easy-to-open metal can top in 1963 led to an increase in the use of metal cans rather than glass bottles for beverages. By the end of 1966 over 45 percent of U.S. beer and over 15 percent of U.S. soft drinks were packaged in metal cans. That same year Continental introduced the first commercially practical welded can. In 1969 the company acquired Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke A.G., the largest packaging producer in the European community. By that time, Continental had 228 manufacturing plants.[3]
By 1973 the metal can industry was in a crisis due to oversupply and tough competition. Both Continental and American Can were said to have made the wrong decisions in the previous decade by adding capacity for both tin plate and tin-free steel production while the aluminum can was gaining popularity. Another problem was growing public opposition to throwaway cans. Continental's profits from domestic can-making dropped from $115 million in 1969 to $52 million in 1973. The company then closed many old-style integrated manufacturing plants in favor of large automated metal-processing centers and separate can-assembly operations situated near its customers' plants. In 1973 the company developed a system for the ultraviolet curing of inks and coatings on metal plate, and installed a number of such systems.[3]

Continental Group[edit]

In 1976, CCC changed its name[4] to the Continental Group, a conglomerate with operations in many countries,[2] but kept "Continental Can" as its packaging unit within Continental Group.[5] In 1987,[6] the remnants of Continental Can became part of the United States Can Company[2] (a subsidiary of Inter-American Packaging)[6] and two of its executives left to form Silgan Holdings. Continental Group was dismantled in 1991 and, in early 1991, Continental Can Company was ordered to pay out $415 million to some 3,700 former employees and members of the United Steel Workers of America, when the courts found that the company had attempted to defraud the employees of pensions during the late 1970s.[5] The rights to the name "Continental Can Company" name and logo were sold in 1991 and renamed to the Viatech Continental Can Company, Inc. in October 1992.[5] In June 1998 Suiza Foods Corporation completed its acquisition of Continental Can.[5] In July 1999, Suiza sold all of Continental Can's U.S. packaging operations in partial exchange for a minority interest in the purchaser, Consolidated Container Company.[7] As of 2000, the only remaining business of Continental Can is Dixie Union, a small flexible film business based in Kempten, Germany.[7]

Deals[edit]

(source[3])
  • 1945 Continental Can Company, Inc.: 150,000 shares of $3.75 cumulative preferred stock
  • 1951 Continental Can Company, Inc.: 104,533 shares $4.25 cumulative second preferred stock (without par value) $15,000,000 3¼% debentures due October 15, 1976
  • 1960 Continental Can Company, Inc.: $30,000,000 4⅝% debentures due October 1, 1985
  • 1970 Continental Can Company, Inc.: $60,000,000 principal amount 8½% sinking fund debentures due August 1, 1990
  • 1974 Continental Can Company, Inc.: 8.85% sinking fund debentures due May 15, 2004
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Operation Varsity Blues Manuel Henriquez

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Manuel Henriquez

Founder, Adviser and Member of the Board of Directors (and for an interim period as the former Chairman & CEO) at Hercules Capital Palo Alto, California Started my career in venture capital in 1987 at BancBoston Ventures, the Bank of Boston ventures subsidiary ... See more
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Manuel Henriquez

Founder, Adviser and Member of the Board of Directors (and for an interim period as the former Chairman & CEO) at Hercules Capital Palo Alto, California Started my career in venture capital in 1987 at BancBoston Ventures, the Bank of Boston ventures subsidiary ... See more
See Profile

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Town of Danville Attempted Murder of Bennett

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Gary Vinson Collins


During September 2004 Pete Bennett was attacked by Gary Vinson Collins who was Danville Building Inspector.

By 2011, he was dead a few weeks after falling to his death at Palo Alto High School, Palo Alto CA



Bennett Litigation


Gary Vinson Collins

Gary Vinson Collins 11/27/68 - 12/19/11 Resident of San Ramon Gary age 43 passed away in Stanford Medical Center as a result of complications resulting from injuries he sustained in a workplace accident. Gary born to Don & Mary Ann Collins grew up in Pleasant Hill and attended Acalanes High School. He spent many years helping his father Don Collins build their family businesses Lafayette Big O Tires and Oakdale Big O Tires. He later moved on to a successful career as a city building inspector. He was well known for his enthusiasm for life with his family and generosity as a loving caring friend. He is survived by his wife and soul-mate Renee Collins and his loving sons Justin 16 and Garrett 10, and his father Don Collins of Pleasant Hill. A Celebration of his life will be held at 4:00 pm January 4th at The Church on The Hill 20801 San Ramon Valley Blvd. San Ramon. A reception will be held for the family immediately following. In lieu of flowers, donations to the children's education fund can be made to CollegeAmerica, account number 73332486. Please mail contributions to American Funds P.O. Box 6164 Indianapolis, IN 46206-5154. - See more at: http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/contracostatimes/obituary.aspx?pid=155268786#sthash.cKUCe4NC.dpuf













A Case for Racketeering?



The Murder of Collins

City Hall December 2, 2011

During a meeting in Walnut Creek City Hall with Chief Bryden, City Manager Ken Nordoff and Pete Bennett, legal documents were passed to Nordoff and Bryden.


By December Gary Vinson Collins was dead





Bennett v. Collins

2404. HOBBS ACT -- UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
In addition to the "wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) defines extortion in terms of "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . under color of official right." In fact, the under color of official right aspect of the Hobbs Act derives from the common law meaning of extortion. As the Supreme Court explained in a recent opinion regarding the Hobbs Act,

"[a]t common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public official who took 'by color of his office' money that was not due to him for the performance of his official duties. . . . Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as 'taking a bribe.'" Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
In order to show a violation of the Hobbs Act under this provision, the Supreme Court recently held that "the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." While the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act with regard to force, violence or fear requires the obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by these means, the under color of official right provision does not require that the public official take steps to induce the extortionate payment: It can be said that "the coercive element is provided by the public office itself." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) ("[t]he public officer's misuse of his office supplies the necessary element of coercion . . . .").

This theory of extortion under color of official right has resulted in the successful prosecution of a wide range of officials, including those serving on the federal, state and local levels. For example: United States v. O'Connor, 910 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 953 (1991) (police officer accepts payments from FBI agents posing as crooked auto parts dealers); United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (international trade official in Department of Commerce accepts payments to influence ruling); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986) (state highway administrator accepts money from road building contractor); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987) (city prosecutors accept money for not prosecuting drunk drivers); United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (city commissioner accepts money for awarding city concession); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986) (judges accept payments to fix cases); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975) (state senator accepts money from landlord seeking government office lease). In United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d at 871-73, the defendant, who was a federal official, unsuccessfully contended that the Hobbs Act only applied to state and local officials and that prosecution of federal official for extortion would have to be exclusively brought under 18 U.S.C. §872: extortion by officers and employees of the United States. The court found that the government could seek a charge under whichever of these two overlapping statutes it thought appropriate. Moreover, "it is not a defense to a charge of extortion under color of official right that the defendant could also have been convicted of bribery." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).

GENERAL RULE: The usual fact situation for a Hobbs Act charge under color of official right is a public official trading his/her official actions in a area in which he/she has actual authority in exchange for the payment of money.

Some cases under certain fact situations, however, have extended the statute further. For example:

Some courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official have de jure power to perform any official act paid for as long as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto power to perform the requested act. See United States v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably believed state senator had the ability to impact a local business); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (public official can extort money for permit beyond control of his office, so long as victim has a reasonable belief that he could affect issuance); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974).
Most courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official be the recipient of the benefit of the extortion, and that a Hobbs Act case exists where the corpus of the corrupt payment went to a third party. However, consistent with the federal offenses of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (see 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105), where the corpus of the corrupt payment inures to the benefit of a person or entity other than the public official most courts have also required proof of a quid pro quo understanding between the private corrupter and the public official. See United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) ("a Hobbs Act prosecution is not defeated simply because the extorter transmitted the extorted money to a third party."); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (insurance agency made kickbacks to brokers selected by political leader of town); United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); United States v. Forszt, 655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Brennan, 629 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986). But see McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)(allegedly corrupt payment made in the form of a campaign contribution to a third party campaign organization was insufficient to support a Hobbs Act conviction absent evidence of a quid pro quo).
Some courts have held that the Hobbs Act can be applied to past or future public officials, as well as to ones who presently occupy a public office at the time the corrupt payment occurs. See United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1035-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (court answered affirmatively the question "whether, within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a crime for candidates for political office to conspire to affect commerce by extortion induced under color of official right during a time frame beginning before the election but not ending until after the candidates have obtained public office."); United States v. Lena, 497 F.Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem., 649 F.2d 861 (3rd Cir. (1981); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232, 1235 (M.D.Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).
Some courts have held that private persons who are not themselves public officials can be convicted under this provision if they caused public officials to perform official acts in return for payments to the non-public official. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (court upheld conviction of head of local Republican Party under color of official right where defendant could be said to have caused, under 18 U.S.C. §2(b), public officials to induce a third party to pay out money); see United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1572-73 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (private attorney's conviction of Hobbs Act violation upheld due to complicity with state senator); United States v. Marcy, 777 F.Supp. 1398, 1399-400 (N.D.Ill. 1991); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). But see United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 829-32 (7th Cir. 1991) ("we believe that, as a general matter and with caveats as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on an 'official rights' theory is inappropriate under the literal and historical meanings of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual 'control' that citizen purports to maintain over governmental activity.").
Some courts have also held that private individuals who make payments to a public official can be charged under the Hobbs Act, either as an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, if he or she is truly the instigator of the transaction. See United States v. Torcasio, 959 F.2d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276-79 (4th Cir. 1986) (conviction affirmed for aiding and abetting extortion under color of official right even though defendant, who paid kickbacks from corporate coffers, was an officer of the victim corporation ); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986). But see United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 823-24 (2d Cir 1990) (consultant employed to help restaurants obtain approvals from corrupt health inspectors had no stake in the conspiracy and was not promoting the outcome).
Finally, in a federal prosecution of a state legislator, there is no legislative privilege barring the introduction at trial of evidence of the defendant's legislative acts. The Supreme Court has held that in such a prosecution a speech or debate type privilege for state legislators cannot be made applicable through Fed.R.Evid. 501. The Court said such privilege is not required by separation of powers considerations or by principles of comity, the two rationales underlying the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, §6, cl. 1. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368-74 (1980).
CAVEAT: The Hobbs Act and Campaign Contributions. The Supreme Court has held that, when an allegedly corrupt payment masquerades as a campaign contribution, and when there is no evidence that the corpus of the "contribution" inured to the personal benefit of the public officer in question or was a product of force or duress, the Hobbs Act requires proof of a quid pro quo agreement between the contributor and the public officer. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). However, the Court has also held that proof that a quid pro quo agreement existed in a corruption case brought under the Hobbs Act may be proven circumstantially. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). This interpretation of the dimensions of the hobbs Act in corruption scenarios is consistent with the parameters of the facts needed to prove the federal crimes of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201. See United States v. Brewster, 50-6 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105, supra.

CAVEAT: The Hobbs Act and evidence of a quid pro quo. When the Hobbs Act is applied to public corruption scenarios that lack evidence of actual "extortionate" duress, some courts have interpreted the Hobbs Act very strictly to require proof of a quid pro quo relationship between the private and the public parties to the transaction, even where the corpus of the payment inured to the personal benefit of the public official. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d. 543 (11th Cir. 1994)(Hobbs Act did not apply to pattern of in-kind payments given personally to Florida mayor in the absence of evidence of a quid pro quo relationship between the mayor and alleged private corrupter); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1993)(same); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1991)(same); contra United States v. Brandford, 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994)(Hobbs Act does not require proof of quid pro quo where corpus of corrupt payment inured to the personal benefit of public officer). In addition, some courts require that corruption cases brought under the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs Act be accompanied by proof that the public official induced the payment. See Montoya, supra.

At the very least, the courts will probably not extend the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs Act beyond the parameters of crimes of bribery and gratuities in relation to federal officials that are described in 18 U.S.C. § 201. See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105, supra. This means that where the corpus of the alleged corrupt payment passed to someone or something other than the public official personally (including those where it passed to a political committee), the Hobbs Act probably does not apply unless there is also evidence of a quid pro quo. And even then, some Circuits, such as the Ninth, require additional proof that the payment was induced by the public official.

PRACTICE TIP: The Public Integrity Section possesses considerable expertise in using the Hobbs Act to prosecute public corruption. While not required, AUSAs are strongly urged to consult with the Public Integrity Section in the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases under this statutory theory. Public Integrity can be reached at 202-514-1412, or by fax at 202-514-3003.

[cited in JM 9-131.010]




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