The Anatomy of Public Corruption

Showing posts with label Hobbs Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hobbs Act. Show all posts

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN TANABE, Defendant.

United States v. Tanabe

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Opinion

Case No: CR 11-0941 SBA

11-19-2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN TANABE, Defendant.


 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

ORDER DENYING

MOTION TO DISMISS

Docket 39

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendant Stephen Tanabe's ("Defendant") motion to dismiss the superseding indictment under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Dkt. 39. The United States ("government") opposes the motion. Dkt. 40. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES the motion to dismiss, for the reasons stated below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

At all times relevant to the superseding indictment, Defendant was a Deputy Sheriff with the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office, assigned to work patrol in Danville, California. Superseding Indictment ¶ 1. Beginning on a date unknown, but no later than November 2, 2010, and continuing through at least on or about January 14, 2011, Defendant and others engaged in an illegal scheme and conspiracy to defraud others by depriving them of their rights to Defendant's honest services as a Deputy Sheriff. Id. ¶ 2.

Beginning on a date no later than November 2, 2010, a private investigator, C.B., agreed to conduct "stings" of husbands and ex-husbands (hereafter "targets") for female  clients involved in divorce, child custody, and other family law disputes. Superseding Indictment ¶ 3. In cases in which the clients advised C.B. that the targets had a tendency to drink and drive, C.B. would arrange for an undercover employee to meet the target at a bar, direct the employee to entice the target to drink alcohol until he was intoxicated, and have a police officer waiting outside the bar to stop and arrest the target for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). Id.

As part of this scheme, Defendant agreed to and did participate in three DUI stings. Superseding Indictment ¶ 4. In two stings, Defendant waited outside the bar for the targets, H.A. and M.K., to exit and then stopped the targets shortly after they drove off. Id. In the third sting, Defendant arranged for another Deputy Sheriff to wait outside the bar, while he remained inside the bar with C.B., monitoring the alcohol intake of the target, D.B. Id. In all cases, the targets were stopped and arrested for DUI. Id. In his incident reports for the arrests he made, Defendant falsely stated that he was on "routine patrol" at the time of the targets' arrests. Id.

In exchange for Defendant making DUI arrests and arranging for another officer to make an arrest, C.B. compensated Defendant with cocaine and a firearm. Superseding Indictment ¶ 5. As part of the scheme, Defendant and C.B. exchanged text messages regarding coordination of the arrests and Defendant's compensation for his role in the arrests. Id. ¶ 6. The texts to and from C.B. passed through the servers of C.B.'s cell service provider, Sprint, located in Kansas City, Missouri. Id.

B. Procedural History

On December 15, 2011, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging Defendant with one count of conspiracy to extort under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; one count of extortion under color of official right, aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2; and two counts of extortion under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Indictment, Dkt. 1. On April 25, 2012, a grand jury returned an eight-count superseding indictment charging Defendant with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and deprivation of honest services in  violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; three counts of wire fraud and deprivation of honest services in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346; one count of conspiracy to extort under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; one count of extortion under color of official right, aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2; and two counts of extortion under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Superseding Indictment, Dkt. 24.

On July 16, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Dkt. 39. The government filed an opposition on July 31, 2012. Dkt. 40. Defendant did not file a reply brief.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

An indictment "must be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. . . ." Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). A defendant may move to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). "In ruling on a pre-trial motion to dismiss an indictment for failure to state an offense, the district court is bound by the four corners of the indictment." United States v. Boren278 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). "On [such] a motion . . . , the court must accept the truth of the allegations in the indictment in analyzing whether a cognizable offense has been charged." Id. (citation omitted).

"An indictment must provide the essential facts necessary to apprise a defendant of the crime charged; it need not specify the theories or evidence upon which the government will rely to prove those facts." United States v. Cochrane985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Jenkins884 F.2d 433, 438-439 (9th Cir. 1989)). An indictment is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if it (1) "contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend" and (2) "enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Lazarenko564 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). An indictment should be read in its entirety,  construed according to common sense, and interpreted to include facts which are necessarily implied. Id. "In cases where the indictment 'tracks the words of the statute charging the offense,' the indictment will be held sufficient 'so long as the words unambiguously set forth all elements necessary to constitute the offense.' " United States v. Davis336 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss Counts 1-8 of the superseding indictment on the ground that the government has failed to allege essential elements of the charges alleged. Def.'s Mtn. at 3. Defendant's arguments are discussed in turn below.

In its opposition papers, the government represents that it "intends to amend the indictment to omit Count Five, conspiracy to extort under color of official right, for the reasons stated by this Court during the plea colloquy for co-conspirator Christopher Butler. The government will do so after the Court rules on this motion." Pl.'s Opp. at 10.

1. Honest Services Wire Fraud

Counts 1-4 of the superseding indictment charge Defendant with one count of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud and three counts of honest services wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1359, 1343 and 1346. See Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 7-10. The wire fraud statute provides:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1343. "To convict a person of wire fraud, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused (1) participated in a scheme to defraud; and (2) used the wires to further the scheme." United States v. Ciccone219 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

As explained by the Ninth Circuit, federal prosecutors have used § 1343, as well as the substantially similar mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, to develop a theory of "honest services fraud," which occurs when an employee deprives his employer of its right to have  its affairs conducted "free from deceit, fraud, dishonesty, conflict of interest, and self-enrichment," and consistent with the employee's fiduciary duties to the employer. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 2009). When a public official is involved, the theory relies on the idea that a public official acts as trustee for the citizens and the State and thus owes the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, e.g., honesty and loyalty to them. Id.see United States v. Woodard459 F.3d 1078, 1082, 1086 (11th Cir. 2006) (a police officer is a public official that owes a "fiduciary duty to the public to make governmental decisions in the public's best interest"; noting that a police officer's misuse of his office for private gain constitutes fraud).

18 U.S.C. § 1346 provides that the behavior punishable under the wire fraud statute includes a scheme or artifice "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." The Supreme Court has recently held that § 1346, which codifies the offense of honest-services fraud, only criminalizes bribe-and-kickback schemes. See United States v. Pelisamen641 F.3d 399, 402, 404-405 (9th Cir. 2011) ("a defendant may not be convicted of honest-services fraud, except in cases involving bribes or kickbacks"; noting that the "Supreme Court has recently held that the offense of honest-services fraud . . . is unconstitutionally vague when applied to conduct other than bribery and kickbacks") (citing Skilling v. United States130 S.Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010)).

In Skilling, the Supreme Court did not define bribery or kickbacks. However, the Supreme Court cited a statutory definition of kickbacks. Skilling130 S. Ct. at 2933-2934 (" 'The term 'kickback' means any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or compensation of any kind which is provided, directly or indirectly, to [enumerated persons] for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with [enumerated circumstances].' ") (quoting 41 U.S.C. 52(2)).

While the term "honest services" is not defined in the statute, "the paradigm case of honest services fraud is the bribery of a public official." See United States v. Langford647 F.3d 1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Bohonus628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1980) (schemes which deprive others of intangible rights most often involve bribery of public officials). In cases involving bribery of public officials, "[t]he requisite 'scheme or artifice to defraud' is found in the deprivation of the public's right to honest and  faithful government. When a public official is bribed, he is paid for making a decision while purporting to be exercising his independent discretion. The fraud element is therefore satisfied." Bohonus628 F.2d at 1171.

In the Ninth Circuit, bribery requires at least an implicit quid pro quo. Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d at 941. "Only individuals who can be shown to have had the specific intent to trade official actions for items of value are subject to criminal punishment on this theory of honest services fraud." Id. at 943, n. 15. The quid pro quo necessary for a bribery honest services conviction need not be explicit, and an implicit quid pro quo need not concern a specific official act. Id. at 943 (citing United States v. Kemp500 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he government need not prove that each gift was provided with the intent to prompt a specific official act.")). A quid pro quo requirement is satisfied if the evidence shows a course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official acts favorable to the donor. Id. at 943.

Relying on Skilling, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that the breach of a fiduciary duty is a required element of honest services fraud. United States v. Milovanovic678 F.3d 713, 721-722, 728-729 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that in Skilling the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he 'vast majority' of the honest-services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes."). The fiduciary duty required is not limited to the classic definition of the term but also extends to defendants who assume a comparable duty of loyalty, trust, or confidence with the victim. Id. at 723-724. "The existence of a fiduciary duty in a criminal prosecution is a fact-based  determination that must ultimately be determined by a jury properly instructed on this issue." Id. at 723.

In Milovanovic, the Defendant was not charged with honest services wire fraud in violation of § 1343; rather, he was charged with the substantially similar mail fraud statute, § 1341. See Milovanovic678 F.3d at 719, n. 4.

"A fiduciary is generally defined as '[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor. . . .' " Milovanovic678 F.3d at 722 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.)). And courts have held that "fiduciary" encompasses informal fiduciaries. See id.

A specific intent to defraud is also a required element of honest services fraud. Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d at 941. As with mail fraud, "materiality" is also an essential element of the crime of wire fraud. Neder v. United States527 U.S. 1, 20-25 (1999); Milovanovic678 F.3d at 726-727 (adopting the "materiality test" to bring § 1346 in line with the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes). In the case of mail or wire fraud, the government need not prove a specific false statement was made. See United States v. Woods335 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2003) (if a scheme is devised with the intent to defraud, the fact that there is no misrepresentation of a single existing fact is immaterial; it is only necessary to prove that it is a scheme reasonably calculated to deceive); United States v. Omer395 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (it is the materiality of the scheme or artifice that must be alleged; the materiality of a specific statement need not be pleaded). "[T]he fraudulent nature of the 'scheme or artifice to defraud' is measured by a non-technical standard." Woods, 335 F.3d at 998. "Thus, schemes are condemned which are contrary to public policy or which fail to measure up to the reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of society." Id.see also Omer395 F.3d at 1089 (noting that "Neder did not undermine this non-technical standard for measuring fraud, which does not require proof of a specific false statement.").

Here, the superseding indictment charges Defendant with a bribery-based scheme to defraud. Defendant contends that dismissal of the honest services fraud counts (i.e., Counts 1-4) is appropriate because "the government has failed to allege any facts pertaining to the breach of a fiduciary duty, the material misrepresentation or material fact concealed by [Defendant], and the quid pro quo agreement by [Defendant] that caused the deprivation o[f] an intangible right of a particular service." Def.'s Mtn. at 4 (italics and alterations added). The Court disagrees. 

The Court finds that the superseding indictment sufficiently alleges these elements of an honest services fraud offense. Reading the superseding indictment in its entirety, construing it according to common sense, and interpreting it to include facts which are necessarily implied, the government has alleged that: (1) Defendant knowingly and intentionally devised and participated in a scheme and artifice to defraud, specifically to deprive the public to whom he owed a fiduciary duty of his honest services as a Deputy Sheriff; (2) the fraudulent scheme involves bribes (i.e., cocaine and a firearm) in exchange for Defendant's services (i.e., making arrests and arranging for another officer to make an arrest); (3) the public was deprived of the intangible benefit of Defendant's honest services through the bribery-based scheme as Defendant misused his position for private gain; and (4) Defendant used the wires (via text messages) to execute the fraudulent scheme.

Defendant argues that Counts 1-4 of the superseding indictment should be dismissed because the superseding indictment does not allege a fiduciary duty or a breach of a fiduciary duty. Def.'s Mtn. at 5. While the superseding indictment does not contain the phrase "fiduciary duty," the superseding indictment fairly read alleges that Defendant, a public official, owed a fiduciary duty to the public to provide honest services, and that he breached his duties of honesty and loyalty to the public through his participation in the bribery-based fraudulent scheme. To the extent Defendant argues that the superseding indictment does not allege a breach of fiduciary duty because Defendant's duties under the law required him to prevent crime and assist in its detection, id., this argument lacks merit. Honest services fraud criminalizes bribery schemes where, as here, a public official receives compensation of any kind in exchange for the performance of official duties favorable to the person providing the compensation. See e.g.Langford647 F.3d at 1321-1322

Defendant does not dispute that he was a public official at the time of the events giving rise to this action. See Woodard459 F.3d at 1096, n. 7 (police officer is a public official that owes the public a fiduciary duty to act in the public's best interest).
--------

Defendant also argues that Counts 1-4 of the superseding indictment should be dismissed because the superseding indictment does not allege a material misrepresentation or the omission of a material fact as required under §§ 1343 and 1346. Def.'s Mtn. at 6. Defendant contends that "[s]ince making an investigatory stop of an intoxicated driver based upon a citizen's tip is not a material misrepresentation, the Court should dismiss the Honest Services counts. . . ." Id. at 6 (alteration added). The Court rejects this argument.

Contrary to Defendant's contention, the government is not required to allege a material misrepresentation or the omission of a material fact to state an actionable charge for honest services wire fraud. See Woods, 335 F.3d at 998-999. The materiality element of a wire fraud offense does not require the government to prove a specific false statement or specific omission. See id. If a scheme is devised with the intent to defraud, . . . the fact that there is no misrepresentation of a single existing fact is immaterial. It is only necessary to prove that it is a scheme reasonably calculated to deceive . . . ." Id. at 998 (emphasis in original). A review of the superseding indictment reveals that the government has sufficiently alleged the materiality element of an honest services wire fraud offense. The superseding indictment fairly read alleges that Defendant participated in a "scheme reasonably calculated to deceive," which deprived the public of its right to Defendant's honest services. Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that the government is required to allege a material misrepresentation or the omission of a material fact, the superseding indictment alleges that the Defendant made specific false statements in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. Specifically, it alleges that Defendant falsely stated in his incident reports for the DUI arrests that he was on "routine patrol." These statements are material misrepresentations because Defendant falsely represented to his employer that he was engaged in official acts on behalf of the public when in fact he was misusing his position for private gain.

Finally, Defendant argues that Counts 1-4 of the superseding indictment should be dismissed because the superseding indictment does not allege an explicit agreement that Defendant received benefits in exchange for a promise of official action. Def.'s Mtn. at 8.  Defendant contends that "[s]ince the superceding [sic] indictment lacks . . . an explicit, certain quid pro quo agreement, the Honest Services Fraud counts are insufficient to state a claim upon which [Defendant] can be charged." Id. at 8 (italics and alterations added). This argument lacks merit. The quid pro quo necessary for a bribery honest services conviction need not be explicit. Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d at 943. A quid pro quo requirement is satisfied if the evidence shows a course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official acts favorable to the donor. Id. Here, the allegations in the superseding indictment are sufficient to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss. The superseding indictment alleges that "[i]n exchange for [Defendant] making DUI arrests and arranging for another officer to make an arrest, C.B. compensated [Defendant] with cocaine and a firearm." Superseding Indictment ¶ 5.

2. Hobbs Act

Counts 5-8 of the superseding indictment charge Defendant with violations of the Hobbs Act. Specifically, the superseding indictment charges Defendant with one count of conspiracy to extort under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; one count of extortion under color of official right, aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2; and two counts of extortion under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951See Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 11-18.

18 U.S.C. § 1951 provides:

Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
"The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).

To convict Defendant of Hobbs Act extortion under a color of official right theory, the government must prove that he: (1) was a government official; (2) who accepted  property to which he was not entitled; (3) knowing that he was not entitled to the property; (4) knowing that the payment was given in return for official acts; and (5) which had at least a de minimis effect on commerce. Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d at 936. A conviction for extortion under color of official right requires that the government prove a quid pro quo. Id. at 937. The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods. Id. (quotation marks omitted). An explicit quid pro quo is not required; an agreement implied from the official's words and actions is sufficient to satisfy this element. Id. (citing Evans v. United States504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) ("[The] Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.")).

Here, Defendant is charged under the "official right" theory of extortion. Defendant contends that dismissal of the Hobbs Act charges is appropriate because "the government failed to allege an obtaining of property of another, the effect [sic] on interstate commerce, or a quid pro quo[,] which are each essential elements of a Hobbs Act violation. Def.'s Mtn. at 8 (italics and alteration added). The Court disagrees.

The Court finds that the superseding indictment sufficiently alleges these elements of a Hobbs Act extortion offense. Reading the superseding indictment in its entirety, construing it according to common sense, and interpreting it to include facts which are necessarily implied, the superseding indictment alleges that Defendant, a Deputy Sheriff, did knowingly and intentionally obstruct, delay, and affect commerce by extortion (or aided and abetted or conspired to do the same) by obtaining property not due to him from C.B. (i.e., cocaine and a firearm), with C.B.'s consent, in exchange for making and arranging traffic stops and arrests for DUI under color of official right.

Defendant argues that Counts 5-8 of the superseding indictment should be dismissed because the allegation that he obtained cocaine and a firearm from C.B. after the DUI arrests, standing alone, cannot establish a Hobbs Act extortion violation. Def.'s Mtn. at 9-10. Defendant, however, did not cite any authority demonstrating that dismissal is  appropriate on this ground. Indeed, with respect to obtaining property, to survive a motion to dismiss the government must allege that Defendant accepted property to which he was not entitled, and that he knew he was not entitled to receive the property. See Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d at 936. The superseding indictment fairly read alleges sufficient facts to satisfy this element of a Hobbs Act extortion offense. The superseding indictment alleges that Defendant knowingly and intentionally obtained property not due to him from C.B. (i.e., cocaine and a firearm), with C.B.'s consent, in exchange for making and arranging traffic stops and arrests for DUI under color of official right.

Defendant also argues that Counts 5-8 of the superseding indictment should be dismissed because "[w]hile the government only needs to prove 'a de minimis effect on interstate commerce,' " there are no allegations in the superseding indictment establishing that Defendant obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate commerce. Def.'s Mtn. at 10 (alteration and italics added). Defendant, however, does not point to any controlling authority establishing that the allegations in the superseding indictment are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on this ground. Moreover, because the superseding indictment tracks the statutory language by alleging that Defendant's extortion affected interstate commerce, the government has adequately pled this element of a Hobbs Act extortion offense. Davis336 F.3d at 922.

Finally, Defendant argues that Counts 5-8 of the superseding indictment should be dismissed because the government failed to allege an explicit quid pro quo agreement between Defendant and C.B. Def.'s Mtn. at 11. Contrary to Defendant's contention, an explicit quid pro quo is not required; an agreement implied from the official's words and actions is sufficient to satisfy this element. See Kincaid-Chauncey556 F.3d at 937 (citing Evans504 U.S. at 268 ("[The] Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.")). Here, the allegations in the superseding indictment fairly read sufficiently allege this element of a Hobbs Act extortion offense. The superseding indictment alleges that Defendant received compensation (i.e., cocaine and a firearm) not  due to him from C.B. in exchange for making DUI arrests and arranging for another officer to make an arrest.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

2. The motion hearing scheduled for November 20, 2012 is VACATED. The parties shall contact the Duty Magistrate Judge of the Oakland Division of this Court forthwith to schedule the matter for a status conference.

3. This Order terminates Docket 39.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

 

 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Great Seal of the United States
Long title An Act to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.
Acronyms (colloquial) AEDPA
Citations
Public law Pub.L. 104–132
Statutes at Large 110 Stat. 1214
Legislative history
  • Introduced in the Senate as S. 735 "Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995" by Bob Dole (R-KS) on April 27, 1995
  • Passed the Senate on June 7, 1995 (91–8)
  • Passed the House on March 14, 1996 (without objection)
  • Reported by the joint conference committee on April 15, 1996; agreed to by the Senate on April 17, 1996 (91-8) and by the House on April 18, 1996 (293–133)
  • Signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 24, 1996
United States Supreme Court cases
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997)
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006)
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, (also known as AEDPA) is an act of the United States Congress signed into law on April 24, 1996. The bill was introduced by former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, passed with broad bipartisan support by Congress (91-8 in the United States Senate, 293-133 in the House of Representatives) following the 1990s World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton.[1][2]
Although controversial for its changes to the law of habeas corpus in the United States (Title I), upheld in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997), the AEDPA also contained a number of provisions to "deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes" in the words of the bill summary. Provisions include
  1. providing restitution/assistance for victims of terrorism (Title II),
  2. designation of foreign terrorist organizations and prohibitions on funding (Title III),
  3. removal or exclusion of alien terrorists and modifications of asylum procedures (Title IV),
  4. restrictions on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (Title V),
  5. implementation of the plastic explosives convention (Title VI),
  6. changes to criminal law involving terrorist (or explosives) offenses, including increased penalties and criminal procedures changes (Title VII),
  7. commissioning a study to determine the constitutionality of restrictions on bomb-making materials (Title VII - A - Sec. 709),
  8. funding changes and jurisdiction clarifications for law enforcement related to terrorism threats (Title VIII),
  9. and miscellaneous provisions in Title IX.

Contents

Habeas corpus

The AEDPA had a tremendous impact on the law of habeas corpus in the United States. One provision of the AEDPA limits the power of federal judges to grant relief[3] unless the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was
  1. contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
  2. based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
In addition to the modifications that pertain to all habeas cases, AEDPA enacted special review provisions for capital cases from states that enacted quality controls for the performance of counsel in the state courts in the post-conviction phase. States that enacted these quality controls would see strict time limitations enforced against their death-row inmates in federal habeas proceedings coupled with extremely deferential review to the determinations of their courts regarding issues of federal law. Only Arizona has qualified for these additional provisions, but it has not been able to take advantage of them because it has not followed its own procedures.
Other provisions of the AEDPA created entirely new statutory law. For example, the judicially created abuse-of-the-writ doctrine had restricted the presentation of new claims through subsequent habeas petitions. The AEDPA replaced this doctrine with an absolute bar on second or successive petitions. Petitioners who attempted to bring claims in federal habeas proceedings that have already been decided in a previous habeas petition would find those claims barred. Additionally, petitioners who had already filed a federal habeas petition were required to first secure authorization from the appropriate federal court of appeals. Furthermore, the AEDPA took away from the Supreme Court the power to review a court of appeals's denial of that permission, thus placing final authority for the filing of second petitions in the hands of the federal courts of appeals.

History

The bill was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, passed with broad bipartisan support by Congress (91-8 in the United States Senate, 293-133 in the House of Representatives) following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 24, 1996.[1][2]
Soon after it was enacted, AEDPA endured a critical test in the Supreme Court. The basis of the challenge was that the provisions limiting the ability of persons to file successive habeas petitions violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the US Constitution, the Suspension Clause. The Supreme Court held unanimously in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997), that these limitations did not unconstitutionally suspend the writ.
In 2005, the United States Ninth Circuit indicated that it was willing to consider a challenge to the constitutionality of AEDPA on separation of powers grounds under City of Boerne v. Flores and Marbury v. Madison,[4] but has since decided that the issue had been settled by circuit precedent.[5]
Basketball player and later coach Steve Kerr and his siblings and mother sued the Iranian government under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, for the 1984 killing of Steve Kerr's father, Malcolm H. Kerr, in Beirut, Lebanon.[6]

Reception

While the act has several titles and provisions, the majority of criticism stems from the act's tightening of habeas corpus laws. Those in favor of the bill say that the act prevents those convicted of crimes from "thwart[ing] justice and avoid[ing] just punishment by filing frivolous appeals for years on end,"[7] while critics argue that the inability to make multiple appeals increases the risk of an innocent person being killed.[3][8]
Other, more recent criticism centers on the deference that the law requires of federal judges in considering habeas petitions. In Sessoms v. Grounds (Ninth Circuit), a majority of the judges believed that the state erred in not throwing out testimony made in the absence of the defendant's attorney after he had requested counsel, but were forced to overturn his appeal. The dissenting opinion said that federal courts can only grant habeas relief where "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents."[9]

See also

References




  • Lundin, Leigh (2009-06-28). "Dark Justice". Criminal Brief.

  • Holland, Joshua (2009-04-01). "A Tale of Two Justice Systems". AlterNet. Prison Legal News. Retrieved 2009-06-29.

  • Lundin, Leigh (2011-10-02). "The Crime of Capital Punishment". Death Penalty. Orlando: SleuthSayers.

  • Denniston, Lyle (2005-05-05). "Is AEDPA unconstitutional?". SCOTUSblog. Archived from the original on 20 March 2011. Retrieved 2011-04-18.

  • "Irons v. Carey". 2007-03-06. Retrieved 2011-04-18.

  • "NBA Finals' Rookie Coaches: Golden State Warriors' Steve Kerr and Cleveland Cavaliers' David Blatt". ABC News.

  • "Congressional Record for April 17, 1996, page S3476" (PDF). 1996-04-17. Retrieved 2011-04-25.

  • Rankin, Bill; Judd, Alan (2003-09-21). "Witnesses Recant; Law Stymies Death Row Appeal". The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. Retrieved 2011-04-25.


    1. Peacock, William (2014-09-24). "5 Judges Issue 3 Dissents From Habeas Grant to Interrogated Teen". FindLaw.

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    2403. Hobbs Act -- Extortion By Force, Violence, Or Fear

    2403. Hobbs Act -- Extortion By Force, Violence, Or Fear


    The Deadwitness.com
    In Civil Litigation
    Near
    Pete Bennett



    In order to prove a violation of Hobbs Act extortion by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, the following questions must be answered affirmatively:
    1. Did the defendant induce or attempt to induce the victim to give up property or property rights? "Property" has been held to be "any valuable right considered as a source of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (the right to solicit garbage collection customers). "Property" includes the right of commercial victims to conduct their businesses. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from wrongful coercion) and cited cases). It also includes the statutory right of union members to democratically participate in union affairs. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (the right to support candidates for union office); United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985) (rights guaranteed union members by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §  411).
    2. Did the defendant use or attempt to use the victim's reasonable fear of physical injury or economic harm in order to induce the victim's consent to give up property? A defendant need not create the fear of injury or harm which he exploits to induce the victim to give up property. See United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 349 and 351 (5th Cir. 1978) (offer by employer to pay union official for labor peace held to be "simply planning for inevitable demand for money" by the union official under the circumstances); United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds and superseded in part on denial of reh'g, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (causing some businesses to refuse operations with the victim sufficiently induced the victim's consent to give up property, consisting of a right to contract freely with other businesses, as long as there were other businesses beyond defendants' control with whom the victim could do business).
      Moreover, attempted extortion may include an attempt to instill fear in a federal agent conducting a covert investigation or a defendant "made of unusually stern stuff." See United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1977) (argument that FBI agent pretending to be extortion victim could not be placed in fear is not a defense to attempted extortion of the agent); see also United States v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1990) (an attempt to instill fear included a demand for money from a victim who knew that the defendant was only pretending to be a federal undercover agent when he threatened the victim with prosecution unless money was paid).
      However, the payment of money in response to a commercial bribe solicitation, that is, under circumstances where the defendant does not threaten the victim with economic harm, but only offers economic assistance in return for payment to which the defendant is not entitled, is not sufficient to prove extortion by fear of economic loss. United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951-52 (2d Cir. 1987) (solicitation of money from job applicants by persons having no decisionmaking authority in return for favorable influence with employment counselors was insufficient evidence of inducement by fear); but see United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (inducement by fear was proven by the defendant's solicitation of a labor consulting contract, to help employer stop outside union organizing, when the solicitation was accompanied by defendant's threat to form another union and begin organizing employees if the consulting contract was not accepted).
    3. Did the defendant's conduct actually or potentially obstruct, delay, or affect interstate or foreign commerce in any (realistic) way or degree? The Hobbs Act regulates extortion and robbery, which Congress has determined have a substantial effect on interstate and foreign commerce by reason of their repetition and aggregate effect on the economy. Therefore, the proscribed offenses fall within the category of crimes based on the Commerce Clause whose "de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no consequence." United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Hobbs Act convictions for robberies whose proceeds the defendant would have used to purchase products in interstate commerce), quoting, United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995); material in brackets added; see also United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (robbery of out-of-state credit and ATM cards); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996) (robbery of commercial business); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995).
      Hobbs Act violations may be supported by proof of a direct effect on the channels or instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, as for example, where the threatened conduct would result in the interruption of the interstate movement of goods or labor. See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of money, unwanted labor, and subcontracts on construction projects by threatened shutdowns and labor unrest); United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1982) (robbery of three undocumented alien farm workers while they were traveling from Mexico to the United States in search of work); United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1987) (scheme to extort local job applicants had a potential effect on interstate applicants who might otherwise be hired).
      Indirect effects on such commerce are also sufficient, as for example, where the obtaining of property and resulting depletion of the victim's assets decreases the victim's ability to make future expenditures for items in interstate commerce. Taylor, supra (depletion of contractors' assets). However, the Seventh Circuit has distinguished Hobbs Act cases involving depletion of a business' assets from those involving the depletion of an individual employee's assets which, the court has ruled, are not as likely to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1982). Other circuits have agreed where the extortion or robbery of an individual has only an "attenuated" or "speculative" effect on some entity or group of individuals engaged in interstate commerce thereby diminishing the "realistic probability" that such commerce will be affected. See United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1994) (conviction for robbery of a computer company employee reversed on grounds that theft of victim's automobile with cellular phone had an insufficient effect on his employer's business); United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding the acquittal, following guilty verdict, of defendants who beat and robbed two individuals in route to buy beer at a liquor store).
    4. Was the defendant's actual or threatened use of force, violence or fear wrongful? Generally, the extortionate obtaining of property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence in a commercial dispute requires proof of a defendant's intent to induce the victim to give up property. No additional proof is required that the defendant was not entitled to such property or that he knew he had no claim to the property which he sought to obtain. See United States v. Agnes, 581 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 293, 297-300 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of right defense to defendant's use of violence to withdraw property from a business partnership).
      However, the Supreme Court has recognized a claim-of-right defense to Hobbs Act extortion in labor-management disputes. In a 1973 decision, the Court reversed the conviction of union-member defendants who had used violence against an employer's property, during an otherwise legitimate economic labor strike, in order "to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services which the employer seeks." United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 400 (1973). The Court reasoned that the legislative history of the Hobbs Act disclosed that Congress had been concerned with attempts by union officials to extort wages for unwanted and fictitious labor, to which employees were not entitled, as contrasted with the policing of legitimate labor strikes in general. Therefore, the Court concluded that the union members' use of violence during the strike was not "wrongful" for purposes of Hobbs Act extortion. The Supreme Court also made a broadly worded statement that
      "wrongful" has meaning in the Act only if it limits the statute's coverage to those instances where the obtaining of the property would itself be "wrongful" because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that property.
    Id.
    In its labor-management context, the claim-of-right defense is not applicable where defendants do not have legitimate labor objectives. The labor claim-of-right defense has been held not to excuse the following kinds of coercive demands:
    • payoffs to union officials and employee representatives in violation of the federal labor laws (29 U.S.C. § 186); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th Cir. 1975) (solicitation of church donation in return for removal of labor pickets); United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1984) (request for payoff to remove pickets);
    • sham fees which labor unions are not entitled to collect under the labor laws; United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1983) (economic coercion of dues and initiation fees from truck drivers who were self-employed or who were told they would receive no member benefits);
    • employee payments which violate existing labor contracts; United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (under threat of job loss, employees' payment of health and pension contributions which labor contract required employer to pay);
    • employer payments to labor unions which are not included in existing labor contracts; United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (violence used to collect fines on employers for non-compliance with union rules which were not made part of the labor contract);
    • demands that a non-union employer cease business operations during a sham union organizing campaign; United States v. Edgar Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (violent campaign by union officials and union-represented competitor to drive the non-union employer out of business under the pretext of persuading employees to join the union and enforce area wage standards);
    • employer payments for labor consulting to establish a bogus "sweetheart union" and thereby discourage legitimate organizing by other unions; United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
    • construction contractors' payments of money, wages for unwanted and superfluous employees, and subcontracts with employee representatives which were unrelated to the hiring of employees. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1319 and 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of contractors by leaders of minority labor coalitions).
    Several courts of appeals have limited the claim-of-right defense to the context of labor-management disputes by refusing to extend the defense to extortionate violence and economic fear in commercial disputes and public corruption cases. United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (violence against union members in retaliation for support of opposition candidate for union office); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir. 1991) (violent threats to obtain consent to enter into business arrangement); United States v. Zappola, 677 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (beating of debtor to coerce repayment of purported debt); United States v. Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1981) (franchisor's violence to compel franchisee to vacate premises); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir.1980) (public official's kickbacks on bail bond settlements); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1979) (solicitation of political contributions); United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 729-730 (10th Cir. 1977) (violence by Native Americans to compel railroad to pay reparations for tribal lands).However, other courts have held that the extortionate use of fear of economic harm in commercial disputes is subject to a claim-of-right defense on the grounds that, unlike violence, the use of economic fear is not inherently "wrongful." See United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 123-24 (1st Cir. 1988) (threat to expose church to litigation unless purported "award" for information was paid to defendant was not a legitimate use of economic fear where the information was false and defamatory); United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1981) (extortion of bogus consulting payments from subcontractor coerced by the threat of labor unrest against the subcontractor's principal).Where the claim-of-right defense applies, courts have generally held that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was not entitled to receive the property which he sought to obtain. United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1979) (demand by labor union official on employer that the official and others be hired for no-show employment using threat of labor unrest); United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1989) (in prosecution involving debtor's withholding of property from a creditor-bank, "the term 'wrongful' requires the government to prove, in cases involving extortion based on economic fear, that the defendant knew that he was not legally entitled to the property that he received."); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to instruct that defendant must know he had no entitlement to property he sought by use of economic fear did not rise to the level of plain error; but "knowledge of the extortion encompasses knowledge of the lack of lawful claim to the property.").
    [cited in USAM 9-131.010]



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