The Anatomy of Public Corruption

Showing posts with label Lee County. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lee County. Show all posts

Clinton Body Count Arkancide Mena Iran Contra Barry Seal Medellin PART 2...









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Estate of Donald Joseph Fontaine and of Judy Lynn Scroggins - A most painful event

The Murders of Donald Joseph Fontaine and Judy Lynn Scroggins

A tragic accident, a most painful event and the CIA Cover-up connected to Colonel Oliver North air-traffic controller for Mena Airport.  





Putting flowers on old best friends graves. RIP Donny Fontaine and Judy Scroggins. 41 years later and it's still sad.









CITY OF CAPE CORAL v. DUVALL

Nos. 81-2068 to 81-2071.

436 So.2d 136 (1983)
CITY OF CAPE CORAL, Appellant, v. Kathy Jean DUVALL, a Minor, by Her Father and Next Friend, William R. Duvall, Appellees. CITY OF CAPE CORAL, Appellant, v. Richard FONTAINE, As Administrator of the Estate of Donald Joseph Fontaine, a Minor, Deceased, Appellee. CITY OF CAPE CORAL, Appellant, v. Camita BEDDOW, As Administratrix of the Estate of Judy Lynn Scroggins, Appellee. CITY OF CAPE CORAL, Appellant, v. John Thomas TKAC and Angela Tkac, Appellees.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Rehearing Denied February 22, 1983.


Attorney(s) appearing for the Case

Chris W. Altenbernd of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, for appellant.
Wagner, Cunningham, Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa, Joe Unger, Miami and Joel D. Eaton and Joel S. Perwin of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, P.A., Miami, for appellees.


RYDER, Judge.
The City of Cape Coral appeals from the final judgment awarding appellees damages for personal injuries. We reverse.
This action began as four lawsuits filed concerning an automobile accident occurring February 15, 1975 in Cape Coral. The plaintiffs/appellees are personal representatives of two parties killed in the accident, Scroggins and Fontaine, Kathy Duvall Ellis and her parents, as well as John Tkac and his wife. The plaintiffs/appellees brought suit against the City of Cape Coral, John Patrick McNally, Margaret McNally, Randall Industries, Inc., William Adkins and three insurance companies. The amended complaint alleges that all the plaintiffs were occupants of a taxicab struck in the rear by an automobile operated by McNally. The complaint alleges McNally had been stopped a few hours earlier by the Cape
[436 So.2d 137]
Coral Police Department. McNally was very intoxicated. The police department did not arrest McNally, but rather delivered him into the custody of Adkins, a cab driver for Jack's Radio Cabs, a subsidiary of Randall Industries. The complaint alleges that the officers negligently failed to determine the correct whereabouts of McNally's residence and the cab company failed to deliver him to his home. The cab company returned McNally to his car and gave him the keys. McNally drove away and shortly thereafter caused the accident and injuries to appellees. Following detailed proof of these allegations at trial, the jury returned a verdict finding McNally, Jack's Radio Cabs and Cape Coral to be at fault, and awarded damages.
On appeal, appellant argues that the lower court erred in giving or refusing various instructions and in failing to direct verdicts on several grounds. We hold that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an applicable statute, and do not discuss the other issues raised.
Section 856.011(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides as follows:
[A]ny peace officer, in lieu of incarcerating an intoxicated person for violation of subsection (1), may take or send the intoxicated person to his home or to a public or private health facility, and the law enforcement officer may take reasonable measures to ascertain the commercial transportation used for such purposes is paid for by such person in advance. Any law enforcement officer so acting shall be considered as carrying out their official duty.
Upon appellant's request to so instruct the jury, the court ruled that the statute did not apply and refused the request. We hold that the statute could be applied to the facts below and that the lower court erred in refusing the instruction.
Additionally, during the pendancy of this appeal, this court has considered a case with nearly identical facts. In Everton v. Willard, 426 So.2d 996, (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), we held that neither a county nor deputy sheriff may be held liable for the exercise of discretion not to arrest a drinking driver, when that driver subsequently causes injury. We adopt the holding and rationale of Everton, and hold that it precludes relief for appellees below.
Accordingly, the judgments below are vacated and the cases remanded for entry of judgment for appellant.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.

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Arthur Frederick Goode, Iii - Killer of Jason Verdow


Arthur Frederick Goode, Jr., Individually and As Next Friendacting on Behalf of Arthur Frederick Goode, Iii,petitioner-appellant, v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary of Corrections, Dept. Of corrections of the State of Florida, et al.,respondents-appellees, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984)

 
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984)

April 4, 1984


Sanford Bohrer, Charles Senatore, Miami, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.
Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, and RONEY and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:
Petitioner Arthur Frederick Goode, III, through his father and next friend, is a Florida prisoner under sentence of death for killing a ten-year-old boy. For the previous history of this case see Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1983); Wainwright v. Goode, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 378, 78 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1983); Goode v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 106 (11th Cir. 1984).
In our 1984 opinion we affirmed the denial of the writ. Then, pursuant to Florida Statute 922.07, the governor of Florida entered an executive order appointing a commission of three psychiatrists to examine Goode. The members of the commission advised the governor that, based upon their examination, Goode (in the language of the statute) understood the nature and the effect of the death penalty and why it was to be imposed upon him. Thereafter, on March 6, the governor signed a warrant directing the execution of Goode; execution is scheduled for April 5, 1984.
On March 30, 1984 Goode filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida, and that court entered its opinion and decision April 2. Goode raised two issues for the first time: (1) that he is presently insane and that it violates the Constitution to execute an insane person, and (2) that Florida Statute 922.07 denies him procedural due process. The Florida Supreme Court rejected both issues on the merits.
On April 3 petitioner filed in the United States District Court, M.D. Florida, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, raising only the two issues that had been raised in the Florida Supreme Court. The district court, without a hearing but with a lengthy opinion, denied the writ April 4, 1984. The court denied a certificate of probable cause and denied a stay of execution.
The matter is now before this court on notice of appeal, application for CPC, and motion for stay of execution and for emergency relief.
The second claim, the attack on the Florida statute, is made on procedural due process grounds. We hold that the statute meets minimum standards required by procedural due process. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 S. Ct. 457, 94 L. Ed. 604 (1950); see also Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 78 S. Ct. 1263, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1531 (1958).
The first claim is rooted in substantive due process and the eighth amendment. In its opinion of April 2 the Florida Supreme Court held that in Florida an insane person cannot be executed. There has been no conclusive determination whether there is such a constitutional entitlement under federal law.1  Assuming that there is such a right, we agree with the district court that petitioner is barred from raising it in this case because of abuse of the writ. Woodard v. Hutchins, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 752, 78 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1984); Rule 9(b) foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In his first federal habeas case Goode contended that he was not competent to stand trial or to waive trial counsel. This court rejected both contentions. 704 F.2d at 596-99. Petitioner asserts that his substantive due process/eighth amendment claim is a newly ripened claim that could not be presented until the governor had gone through the Sec. 922.07 procedures. This theory assumes that the issue of insanity vel non barring execution is dependent upon the governor's implementation of the statutory procedures of Sec. 922.07.2  This is not so. If Goode contended, on substantive due process and eighth amendment grounds, that he could not be executed because of post-conviction insanity, he was free to assert this contention in state and federal courts from the time that the state court sentenced him to death; thereby he could secure an orderly determination of his then current mental condition. Certainly he could have raised the issue when the governor signed his first execution warrant in 1982. Goode has made no such contention in his state merits appeal, in his state collateral attack on his conviction, or in his first federal habeas case.
If the substantive due process/eighth amendment issue of alleged insanity barring execution had been timely raised and determined in court, circumstances might thereafter have changed, and an updated determination of competency might thereafter have been made based on a showing of changed conditions. But this does not mean that post-conviction insanity could be held back as an issue until the eve of execution and then raised for the first time.
The motion for certificate of probable cause is DENIED. The motion for stay is DENIED.
 1
Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 211, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1984)
 2
There has been no authoritative determination of the standards for insanity that bar execution. Gray v. Lucas, supra
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