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Civil Code - CIVDIVISION @hillaryclinton @fbi @realdonaldtrump @DWStweets @salesforce @sharynbovat @SassCBrown

Every Single Face is Deceased - see Clinton Murders



 Civil Code - CIVDIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
PART 4. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM PARTICULAR TRANSACTIONS [1738 - 3273]
TITLE 1.8. PERSONAL DATA [1798 - 1798.78]
CHAPTER 1. Information Practices Act of 1977 [1798 - 1798.78]
ARTICLE 7. Accounting of Disclosures [1798.25 - 1798.29]
1798.29.  
  ( Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14. )


  ( Part 4 enacted 1872. )


  ( Title 1.8 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 709. )


  ( Chapter 1 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 709. )


  ( Article 7 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 709. )

  

(a) Any agency that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information shall disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c), or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system.

(b) Any agency that maintains computerized data that includes personal information that the agency does not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of any breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.

(c) The notification required by this section may be delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal investigation. The notification required by this section shall be made after the law enforcement agency determines that it will not compromise the investigation.

(d) Any agency that is required to issue a security breach notification pursuant to this section shall meet all of the following requirements:

(1) The security breach notification shall be written in plain language, shall be titled “Notice of Data Breach,” and shall present the information described in paragraph (2) under the following headings: “What Happened,” “What Information Was Involved,” “What We Are Doing,” “What You Can Do,” and “For More Information.” Additional information may be provided as a supplement to the notice.

(A) The format of the notice shall be designed to call attention to the nature and significance of the information it contains.
(B) The title and headings in the notice shall be clearly and conspicuously displayed.
(C) The text of the notice and any other notice provided pursuant to this section shall be no smaller than 10-point type.
(D) For a written notice described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (i), use of the model security breach notification form prescribed below or use of the headings described in this paragraph with the information described in paragraph (2), written in plain language, shall be deemed to be in compliance with this subdivision.
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

 

 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Great Seal of the United States
Long title An Act to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.
Acronyms (colloquial) AEDPA
Citations
Public law Pub.L. 104–132
Statutes at Large 110 Stat. 1214
Legislative history
  • Introduced in the Senate as S. 735 "Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995" by Bob Dole (R-KS) on April 27, 1995
  • Passed the Senate on June 7, 1995 (91–8)
  • Passed the House on March 14, 1996 (without objection)
  • Reported by the joint conference committee on April 15, 1996; agreed to by the Senate on April 17, 1996 (91-8) and by the House on April 18, 1996 (293–133)
  • Signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 24, 1996
United States Supreme Court cases
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997)
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006)
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, (also known as AEDPA) is an act of the United States Congress signed into law on April 24, 1996. The bill was introduced by former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, passed with broad bipartisan support by Congress (91-8 in the United States Senate, 293-133 in the House of Representatives) following the 1990s World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton.[1][2]
Although controversial for its changes to the law of habeas corpus in the United States (Title I), upheld in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997), the AEDPA also contained a number of provisions to "deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes" in the words of the bill summary. Provisions include
  1. providing restitution/assistance for victims of terrorism (Title II),
  2. designation of foreign terrorist organizations and prohibitions on funding (Title III),
  3. removal or exclusion of alien terrorists and modifications of asylum procedures (Title IV),
  4. restrictions on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (Title V),
  5. implementation of the plastic explosives convention (Title VI),
  6. changes to criminal law involving terrorist (or explosives) offenses, including increased penalties and criminal procedures changes (Title VII),
  7. commissioning a study to determine the constitutionality of restrictions on bomb-making materials (Title VII - A - Sec. 709),
  8. funding changes and jurisdiction clarifications for law enforcement related to terrorism threats (Title VIII),
  9. and miscellaneous provisions in Title IX.

Contents

Habeas corpus

The AEDPA had a tremendous impact on the law of habeas corpus in the United States. One provision of the AEDPA limits the power of federal judges to grant relief[3] unless the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was
  1. contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
  2. based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
In addition to the modifications that pertain to all habeas cases, AEDPA enacted special review provisions for capital cases from states that enacted quality controls for the performance of counsel in the state courts in the post-conviction phase. States that enacted these quality controls would see strict time limitations enforced against their death-row inmates in federal habeas proceedings coupled with extremely deferential review to the determinations of their courts regarding issues of federal law. Only Arizona has qualified for these additional provisions, but it has not been able to take advantage of them because it has not followed its own procedures.
Other provisions of the AEDPA created entirely new statutory law. For example, the judicially created abuse-of-the-writ doctrine had restricted the presentation of new claims through subsequent habeas petitions. The AEDPA replaced this doctrine with an absolute bar on second or successive petitions. Petitioners who attempted to bring claims in federal habeas proceedings that have already been decided in a previous habeas petition would find those claims barred. Additionally, petitioners who had already filed a federal habeas petition were required to first secure authorization from the appropriate federal court of appeals. Furthermore, the AEDPA took away from the Supreme Court the power to review a court of appeals's denial of that permission, thus placing final authority for the filing of second petitions in the hands of the federal courts of appeals.

History

The bill was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, passed with broad bipartisan support by Congress (91-8 in the United States Senate, 293-133 in the House of Representatives) following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 24, 1996.[1][2]
Soon after it was enacted, AEDPA endured a critical test in the Supreme Court. The basis of the challenge was that the provisions limiting the ability of persons to file successive habeas petitions violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the US Constitution, the Suspension Clause. The Supreme Court held unanimously in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997), that these limitations did not unconstitutionally suspend the writ.
In 2005, the United States Ninth Circuit indicated that it was willing to consider a challenge to the constitutionality of AEDPA on separation of powers grounds under City of Boerne v. Flores and Marbury v. Madison,[4] but has since decided that the issue had been settled by circuit precedent.[5]
Basketball player and later coach Steve Kerr and his siblings and mother sued the Iranian government under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, for the 1984 killing of Steve Kerr's father, Malcolm H. Kerr, in Beirut, Lebanon.[6]

Reception

While the act has several titles and provisions, the majority of criticism stems from the act's tightening of habeas corpus laws. Those in favor of the bill say that the act prevents those convicted of crimes from "thwart[ing] justice and avoid[ing] just punishment by filing frivolous appeals for years on end,"[7] while critics argue that the inability to make multiple appeals increases the risk of an innocent person being killed.[3][8]
Other, more recent criticism centers on the deference that the law requires of federal judges in considering habeas petitions. In Sessoms v. Grounds (Ninth Circuit), a majority of the judges believed that the state erred in not throwing out testimony made in the absence of the defendant's attorney after he had requested counsel, but were forced to overturn his appeal. The dissenting opinion said that federal courts can only grant habeas relief where "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents."[9]

See also

References




  • Lundin, Leigh (2009-06-28). "Dark Justice". Criminal Brief.

  • Holland, Joshua (2009-04-01). "A Tale of Two Justice Systems". AlterNet. Prison Legal News. Retrieved 2009-06-29.

  • Lundin, Leigh (2011-10-02). "The Crime of Capital Punishment". Death Penalty. Orlando: SleuthSayers.

  • Denniston, Lyle (2005-05-05). "Is AEDPA unconstitutional?". SCOTUSblog. Archived from the original on 20 March 2011. Retrieved 2011-04-18.

  • "Irons v. Carey". 2007-03-06. Retrieved 2011-04-18.

  • "NBA Finals' Rookie Coaches: Golden State Warriors' Steve Kerr and Cleveland Cavaliers' David Blatt". ABC News.

  • "Congressional Record for April 17, 1996, page S3476" (PDF). 1996-04-17. Retrieved 2011-04-25.

  • Rankin, Bill; Judd, Alan (2003-09-21). "Witnesses Recant; Law Stymies Death Row Appeal". The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. Retrieved 2011-04-25.


    1. Peacock, William (2014-09-24). "5 Judges Issue 3 Dissents From Habeas Grant to Interrogated Teen". FindLaw.

    External links

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    2405. Form Indictment -- Interference With Commerce By Extortion Consisting Of Threats, Violence Or Fear (18 U.S.C. 1951)

     



    THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:
    1. That at all times material to this Indictment (victim whose property was to be obtained) was engaged in (describe commercial activities) , in [interstate][foreign] commerce and an industry which affects [interstate][foreign] commerce.
    2. That on (date) in the ____________ District of ______________ the defendant _________________ did unlawfully obstruct, delay and affect, and attempt to obstruct, delay and affect, commerce as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce, by extortion, as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, in that the defendant ____________ did obtain and attempt to obtain (tangible or intangible property) the property of (victim with connection to commerce) with his/her consent having been induced by the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence and fear, [including fear of economic harm,] in that the defendant did (describe defendant's wrongful use of force, violence or fear) .
    All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951.
    ** See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), holding that violence undertaken by the parties to labor-management relations is "wrongful" only if they have no legitimate claim under the federal labor laws to the wages, benefits, and other property which they seek to obtain.
    [cited in Criminal Resource Manual 2402; USAM 9-131.010]
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    2403. Hobbs Act -- Extortion By Force, Violence, Or Fear

    2403. Hobbs Act -- Extortion By Force, Violence, Or Fear


    In order to prove a violation of Hobbs Act extortion by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, the following questions must be answered affirmatively:
    1. Did the defendant induce or attempt to induce the victim to give up property or property rights? "Property" has been held to be "any valuable right considered as a source of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (the right to solicit garbage collection customers). "Property" includes the right of commercial victims to conduct their businesses. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from wrongful coercion) and cited cases). It also includes the statutory right of union members to democratically participate in union affairs. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (the right to support candidates for union office); United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985) (rights guaranteed union members by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §  411).
    2. Did the defendant use or attempt to use the victim's reasonable fear of physical injury or economic harm in order to induce the victim's consent to give up property? A defendant need not create the fear of injury or harm which he exploits to induce the victim to give up property. See United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 349 and 351 (5th Cir. 1978) (offer by employer to pay union official for labor peace held to be "simply planning for inevitable demand for money" by the union official under the circumstances); United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds and superseded in part on denial of reh'g, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (causing some businesses to refuse operations with the victim sufficiently induced the victim's consent to give up property, consisting of a right to contract freely with other businesses, as long as there were other businesses beyond defendants' control with whom the victim could do business).
      Moreover, attempted extortion may include an attempt to instill fear in a federal agent conducting a covert investigation or a defendant "made of unusually stern stuff." See United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1977) (argument that FBI agent pretending to be extortion victim could not be placed in fear is not a defense to attempted extortion of the agent); see also United States v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1990) (an attempt to instill fear included a demand for money from a victim who knew that the defendant was only pretending to be a federal undercover agent when he threatened the victim with prosecution unless money was paid).
      However, the payment of money in response to a commercial bribe solicitation, that is, under circumstances where the defendant does not threaten the victim with economic harm, but only offers economic assistance in return for payment to which the defendant is not entitled, is not sufficient to prove extortion by fear of economic loss. United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951-52 (2d Cir. 1987) (solicitation of money from job applicants by persons having no decisionmaking authority in return for favorable influence with employment counselors was insufficient evidence of inducement by fear); but see United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (inducement by fear was proven by the defendant's solicitation of a labor consulting contract, to help employer stop outside union organizing, when the solicitation was accompanied by defendant's threat to form another union and begin organizing employees if the consulting contract was not accepted).
    3. Did the defendant's conduct actually or potentially obstruct, delay, or affect interstate or foreign commerce in any (realistic) way or degree? The Hobbs Act regulates extortion and robbery, which Congress has determined have a substantial effect on interstate and foreign commerce by reason of their repetition and aggregate effect on the economy. Therefore, the proscribed offenses fall within the category of crimes based on the Commerce Clause whose "de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no consequence." United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Hobbs Act convictions for robberies whose proceeds the defendant would have used to purchase products in interstate commerce), quoting, United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995); material in brackets added; see also United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (robbery of out-of-state credit and ATM cards); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996) (robbery of commercial business); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995).
      Hobbs Act violations may be supported by proof of a direct effect on the channels or instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, as for example, where the threatened conduct would result in the interruption of the interstate movement of goods or labor. See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of money, unwanted labor, and subcontracts on construction projects by threatened shutdowns and labor unrest); United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1982) (robbery of three undocumented alien farm workers while they were traveling from Mexico to the United States in search of work); United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1987) (scheme to extort local job applicants had a potential effect on interstate applicants who might otherwise be hired).
      Indirect effects on such commerce are also sufficient, as for example, where the obtaining of property and resulting depletion of the victim's assets decreases the victim's ability to make future expenditures for items in interstate commerce. Taylor, supra (depletion of contractors' assets). However, the Seventh Circuit has distinguished Hobbs Act cases involving depletion of a business' assets from those involving the depletion of an individual employee's assets which, the court has ruled, are not as likely to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1982). Other circuits have agreed where the extortion or robbery of an individual has only an "attenuated" or "speculative" effect on some entity or group of individuals engaged in interstate commerce thereby diminishing the "realistic probability" that such commerce will be affected. See United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1994) (conviction for robbery of a computer company employee reversed on grounds that theft of victim's automobile with cellular phone had an insufficient effect on his employer's business); United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding the acquittal, following guilty verdict, of defendants who beat and robbed two individuals in route to buy beer at a liquor store).
    4. Was the defendant's actual or threatened use of force, violence or fear wrongful? Generally, the extortionate obtaining of property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence in a commercial dispute requires proof of a defendant's intent to induce the victim to give up property. No additional proof is required that the defendant was not entitled to such property or that he knew he had no claim to the property which he sought to obtain. See United States v. Agnes, 581 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 293, 297-300 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of right defense to defendant's use of violence to withdraw property from a business partnership).
      However, the Supreme Court has recognized a claim-of-right defense to Hobbs Act extortion in labor-management disputes. In a 1973 decision, the Court reversed the conviction of union-member defendants who had used violence against an employer's property, during an otherwise legitimate economic labor strike, in order "to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services which the employer seeks." United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 400 (1973). The Court reasoned that the legislative history of the Hobbs Act disclosed that Congress had been concerned with attempts by union officials to extort wages for unwanted and fictitious labor, to which employees were not entitled, as contrasted with the policing of legitimate labor strikes in general. Therefore, the Court concluded that the union members' use of violence during the strike was not "wrongful" for purposes of Hobbs Act extortion. The Supreme Court also made a broadly worded statement that
      "wrongful" has meaning in the Act only if it limits the statute's coverage to those instances where the obtaining of the property would itself be "wrongful" because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that property.
    Id.
    In its labor-management context, the claim-of-right defense is not applicable where defendants do not have legitimate labor objectives. The labor claim-of-right defense has been held not to excuse the following kinds of coercive demands:
    • payoffs to union officials and employee representatives in violation of the federal labor laws (29 U.S.C. § 186); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th Cir. 1975) (solicitation of church donation in return for removal of labor pickets); United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1984) (request for payoff to remove pickets);
    • sham fees which labor unions are not entitled to collect under the labor laws; United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1983) (economic coercion of dues and initiation fees from truck drivers who were self-employed or who were told they would receive no member benefits);
    • employee payments which violate existing labor contracts; United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (under threat of job loss, employees' payment of health and pension contributions which labor contract required employer to pay);
    • employer payments to labor unions which are not included in existing labor contracts; United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (violence used to collect fines on employers for non-compliance with union rules which were not made part of the labor contract);
    • demands that a non-union employer cease business operations during a sham union organizing campaign; United States v. Edgar Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (violent campaign by union officials and union-represented competitor to drive the non-union employer out of business under the pretext of persuading employees to join the union and enforce area wage standards);
    • employer payments for labor consulting to establish a bogus "sweetheart union" and thereby discourage legitimate organizing by other unions; United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
    • construction contractors' payments of money, wages for unwanted and superfluous employees, and subcontracts with employee representatives which were unrelated to the hiring of employees. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1319 and 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of contractors by leaders of minority labor coalitions).
    Several courts of appeals have limited the claim-of-right defense to the context of labor-management disputes by refusing to extend the defense to extortionate violence and economic fear in commercial disputes and public corruption cases. United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (violence against union members in retaliation for support of opposition candidate for union office); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir. 1991) (violent threats to obtain consent to enter into business arrangement); United States v. Zappola, 677 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (beating of debtor to coerce repayment of purported debt); United States v. Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1981) (franchisor's violence to compel franchisee to vacate premises); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir.1980) (public official's kickbacks on bail bond settlements); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1979) (solicitation of political contributions); United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 729-730 (10th Cir. 1977) (violence by Native Americans to compel railroad to pay reparations for tribal lands).However, other courts have held that the extortionate use of fear of economic harm in commercial disputes is subject to a claim-of-right defense on the grounds that, unlike violence, the use of economic fear is not inherently "wrongful." See United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 123-24 (1st Cir. 1988) (threat to expose church to litigation unless purported "award" for information was paid to defendant was not a legitimate use of economic fear where the information was false and defamatory); United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1981) (extortion of bogus consulting payments from subcontractor coerced by the threat of labor unrest against the subcontractor's principal).Where the claim-of-right defense applies, courts have generally held that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was not entitled to receive the property which he sought to obtain. United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1979) (demand by labor union official on employer that the official and others be hired for no-show employment using threat of labor unrest); United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1989) (in prosecution involving debtor's withholding of property from a creditor-bank, "the term 'wrongful' requires the government to prove, in cases involving extortion based on economic fear, that the defendant knew that he was not legally entitled to the property that he received."); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to instruct that defendant must know he had no entitlement to property he sought by use of economic fear did not rise to the level of plain error; but "knowledge of the extortion encompasses knowledge of the lack of lawful claim to the property.").
    [cited in USAM 9-131.010]



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    2402. Hobbs Act -- Generally

    2402. Hobbs Act -- Generally



    The Hobbs Act prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce "in any way or degree." Section 1951 also proscribes conspiracy to commit robbery or extortion without reference to the conspiracy statute at 18 U.S.C. § 371. The statutory prohibition of "physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section" is confined to violence for the purpose of committing robbery or extortion. United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 31 (6th Cir. 1975) (rejecting the view that the statute proscribes all physical violence obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce as contrasted with violence designed to culminate in robbery or extortion).

    The extortion offense reaches both the obtaining of property "under color of official right" by public officials and the obtaining of property by private actors with the victim's "consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," including fear of economic harm. See this Manual at 2405 and Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 265, 112 S.Ct. 1181, 1188 (1992) (only a private individual's extortion of property by the wrongful use of force, violence, or fear requires that the victim's consent be induced by these means; extortion of property under color of official right does not require that a public official take steps to induce the extortionate payment).

    Although the Hobbs Act was enacted in 1946 to combat racketeering in labor-management disputes, the extortion statute is frequently used in connection with cases involving public corruption, commercial disputes, and corruption directed at members of labor unions. Proof of "racketeering" as an element of Hobbs Act offenses is not required. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 98 S.Ct. 1112 (1978). However, a violation of the Hobbs Act may be part of a "pattern of racketeering activity" for purposes of prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute (18 U.S.C. §  1961, et seq.).
    [cited in USAM 9-131.010]
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    G4S - The mercenaries and snipers among us

    Their superior firepower beyond obvious and with the deaths in Orlando it's time to ask real questions about G4S with their expansive footprint. 
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