The Anatomy of Public Corruption

Showing posts with label Silver Lake Partners. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Silver Lake Partners. Show all posts

Steve Burd Profile - Silverlake Partners, Southern Pacific, Blackhawk Network, Safeway, CEO Steve Burd, Philip Anschutz, Milken, and CEO Larry Ellison

 this story is decades in the making but Pete Bennett owner of Mainframe designs cabinets pictures lost his his business after litigation with planet vs. Southern Pacific Ananda Bennett with the help of the sheriff and the coroner they covered up the murder of his witness for decades.

Ellen and Bill Tauscher owners of computer in stores was actually finish client but we never produced anything for them. Through that relationship and Computer Link korporate eventually Bennett was hired as a as second career to develop the budget forecasting program for ComputerLand stores directly across the street from Vanstarr.

Bennett had to go to Ellen for specialized changes so the SQL Scripts coming off of their systems which is where Bennett discovered the fraud.

By then computerland have been spun off to another distributor called MeriselFab.

Keep Bennett was hired by the new owners to rewrite a series of reports which was about three hundred of them and consolidate them to the spreadsheet server.

Bennett being an outside contractor and relatively new in Fortune 500 produce the reports and told management they were losing money all the refunds went back to apple and a few other companies.

Now that Apple's trillion-dollar company maybe it's time that they pay off the employees at computerland that lost their entire retirement when Bennett's reports produce the truth about the rma's so many went back to Apple.

What Benetton coverage was most of the 25 million that he found never shipped in the first place because Van star controlled by Tauscher now with Silverlake partners orchestrated the fraud using the Mars system that they controlled and the Fulfillment model where computer land was basically a sales organization advanstar controled the distribution.

Show before the sale in 1993 they just pumped out the numbers puffed up the books good enough that another company came along and bought them out.

Bennett bumped into Ellen Tauscher at Broadway Plaza oh, already homeless beating on a regular basis and dealing with corruption in Walnut Creek and surrounding areas. He shared his situation in Spring of 2014 and not long after more people died it was a bloody year.


Silverlake Partners, NYFed, AT&T and Building 7

One of the key reasons I have focused on Silverlake partners is the connection to the New York fed, the connection to Glenn Hutchins of AT&T oh, the highly of it in connection to Elevation partners and also litigation involving HomeStore a case apparently pretty fraudulent next to Wilson sonsini and that leads to mulesoft, Salesforce and yours truly the oracle versus Salesforce hostile takeover.

One key part of that is the connection a former CEO Steve burd of Safeway and his relationship with attorney Richard Stanford Kopf.

In the 1980s Safeway was a customer of Mainframe designs cabinet fixtures owned by Pete Bennett who developed fixtures for Safeway Wells Fargo Bank of America and many other well-known enemies.

His lawsuit ended in Flames when they killed his witness in 1989 it was covered up with the help of Sheriff Richard Rainey because when you control the coroner's office he don't count very well when the body start stacking up.

Private equity
Founded1999; 21 years ago
FounderJim Davidson, David Roux, Roger McNameeGlenn Hutchins
HeadquartersMenlo ParkCaliforniaUnited States
Number of locationsMultiple offices in 3 countries
Key peopleMike Bingle
Egon Durban
Ken Hao
Greg Mondre
Joe Osnoss
ProductsInvestment funds
AUMUS$43 billion (2020)[1]

Bono, Silverlake, Wilson Sonsini, Salesforce, PeopleSoft

So I sued Southern Pacific in 87 I lost when someone killed my witness who was a 21 year old man from Walnut Creek.

It seems my histories constantly criss-crosses with litigation near Wilson sonsini, PG&E bill Tauscher of computerland and former Safeway CEO Steve Burd with additional crossovers into Blackhawk Network Silverlake partners elevation partners and also CEO Philip Anschutz, Michael Milken of the junk Bond theme, and his friend Larry Ellison former CIA programmer that probably knows who killed my Witnesses and my friends in 1975.

 in the middle of this is a company called FICO, a virus called nimda that could have very well been created by CIA experts the ones that lost all all they're spooked tools at the CIA who would easily know how to execute a virus to propagate around the the globe that would work especially well if you have an unwitting Insider parked in front of 3,000 servers at SBC with a virus likes to look at servers and explode from there


Stanford University Law School - Securities Class Action Clearinghouse


BRUCE G. VANYO, State Bar # 060134
LAURIE B. SMILAN, State Bar # 116740
DAVID PRIEBE, State Bar # 148679
MICHELE E. ROSE, State Bar # 154656
SUSAN BOWER, State Bar # 173244
Professional Corporation
650 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, California 94304-1050
Telephone: (650) 493-9300

Attorneys for Defendants



and TAMMY NEWMAN, On Behalf of
Themselves and All Other Similarly Situated,






CASE NO.: C-98-0216-MJJ



[filed c. Oct. 23, 1998]

Date: November 3, 1998
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Court: Honorable
      Martin J. Jenkins


Plaintiffs have moved to strike certain documents submitted with Vanstar's motion to dismiss: Vanstar's 1997 Form 14A ("Form 14A") and a calculation of stock sales by Vanstar's officers and directors ("Appendix"), which is taken directly from publicly filed SEC documents upon which plaintiffs rely. Plaintiffs argue that these documents are "outside" the Complaint, and therefore cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs also argue that the documents constitute inadmissible hearsay.

Plaintiffs' arguments are ill-founded. Under the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, plaintiffs must plead specific facts giving rise to a strong inference of each defendant's required state of mind (i.e., scienter), or the Complaint must be dismissed. Plaintiffs attempt to plead scienter by arguing that the individual defendants' stock sales were unusual or suspicious. The documents in question simply assist the Court in analyzing the judicially noticeable information provided by plaintiffs. Courts in securities class action cases routinely take judicial notice of SEC filings -- including documents which demonstrate that stock sale allegations are false -- and will dismiss allegations which are inconsistent with the filings. It is contrary to the Reform Act, and palpably unfair, for plaintiffs to claim that the documents must be excluded from the Court's consideration, while at the same time averring that their stock sale allegations taken from the same documents, which may be judicially noticed, give rise to a strong inference of scienter. Thus, the Court should deny plaintiffs' motion; or, if the Court is inclined to strike these documents, it should also strike plaintiffs' stock sale allegations.

Moreover, the documents are not "outside" the Complaint as they deal directly with allegations in the complaint. The law is clear that the mere fact that plaintiffs neglect to attach documents integral to their complaint does not render such documents "outside" a complaint, nor preclude the Court from considering the documents in a motion to dismiss. The Form 14A reveals the stock ownership of Vanstar's most senior management, ownership that is at the heart of plaintiffs' scienter allegations. Likewise, the Appendix was prepared directly from the Forms 3 and 4 filed with the SEC, which plaintiffs clearly used in drafting the Complaint (there is no other ultimate source from which plaintiffs could have obtained otherwise confidential information regarding the individual defendants' stock sales and holdings). Plaintiffs cannot seriously complain about a chart that was prepared to assist the Court in analyzing judicially noticeable information that was first provided by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' hearsay objection also is misplaced. Plaintiffs waived any such objection by choosing to include in their Complaint stock sale allegations in the first instance. Moreover, to the extent the Form 14A is referenced for the truth of the matters asserted therein, it is admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Finally, as plaintiffs themselves admit, the documents at issue were not offered solely for their truth value: rather, they are also offered to indicate the individual defendants' state of mind., i.e., were they selling or retaining significant portions of their net worth in the securities of the Company.



    A. Courts Routinely Take Judicial Notice of SEC Filings.

When deciding motions to dismiss, courts routinely take judicial notice of, or otherwise consider, documents other than the complaint.1 Indeed, the great weight of authority holds that SEC filings are properly considered when deciding a motion to dismiss, and that those filings are properly the subject of judicial notice. Seee.g.Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (denying plaintiff's motion to strike documents filed with the SEC, specifically Form 4s showing the actual number of shares sold during the class period); In re Silicon Graphics Securities Lit., 970 F. Supp. 746, 758 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (court may take judicial notice of the contents of relevant public disclosure documents required to be filed with the SEC) (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)); In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[T]he court may review 'public disclosure documents required by law to be and which actually have been filed with the SEC.'") (quotation omitted); Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1206 n. 13, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996) ("In deciding a motion to dismiss a securities action, a court may properly consider the relevant entirety of a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, even though not attached to the complaint, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment."); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1996) ("When deciding a motion to dismiss a claim for securities fraud on the pleadings, a court may consider the contents of relevant public disclosure documents which (1) are required to be filed with the SEC and (2) are actually filed with the SEC.").2

    B. Courts May Take Judicial Notice of Documents "Outside" the Complaint.

Plaintiffs also assert that the subject documents do not fall within the scope of judicial notice because they are "outside" the Complaint. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 3-4. It is well settled, however, that a document need not be attached to a complaint in order for a court to properly consider it when deciding a motion to dismiss. In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1996) ("When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the complaint and 'documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.'") (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994)).3

Here, the authenticity of the subject documents is not truly disputed, and their contents are integral to the Complaint. The Form 14A reveals the stock ownership of Vanstar's senior most management and plaintiffs have made this ownership a central issue of the Complaint. Likewise, the Appendix was prepared directly from the Forms 3 and 4 which are the exact documents plaintiffs used to draft the Complaint.4 All that Defendants have done here is present the same judicially noticeable, integral information plaintiffs have included in their Complaint in such a way as to assist the Court.5


Plaintiffs contend that even if the exhibits are properly the subject of judicial notice, the Court may not consider them because they may not be submitted to disprove scienter and because they constitute hearsay. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 4-6. Plaintiffs similarly argue that cases which have judicially noticed SEC filings have only taken judicial notice of the fact that the documents were filed or where the misrepresentations were contained in those documents. Id. at 4-5. For three reasons, plaintiffs are wrong.

First, as shown above, plaintiffs themselves have alleged the truth of the matters asserted in the documents. Their Complaint alleges that the individual defendants sold particular amounts of stock, at particular prices, on particular dates. It also alleges that the individual defendants sold particular (albeit inflated) percentages of their stock holdings. Complaint ¶¶ 138-141. Thus, plaintiffs cannot complain if and when Defendants refer to the same SEC filings, or information extracted from the filings for the truth of the matters asserted therein. This is precisely the reason that courts have taken judicial notice of stock sales in securities cases. See Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 759 ("Having raised questions about defendants' stock sales, [and] based their allegations on defendants' SEC filings . . . plaintiffs can hardly complain when defendants refer to the same information in their defense."); Wenger at 1240 n.8 (denying plaintiff's motion to strike documents filed with the SEC, specifically Form 4s showing the actual number of shares sold during the class period); see also United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection).

Second, the exhibits are offered not only for their truth value, but also to demonstrate the state of mind of the individual defendants. As such, they are excepted from the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). Plaintiffs admit that these documents would demonstrate state of mind, if accepted by the Court. Pl. Br. at 6. Plaintiffs attempt to plead the individual defendants' state of mind by asserting that each of them intended to sell unusual amounts of Vanstar stock, rather than retaining his or her shares and stock options. Thus, the documents are relevant to plaintiffs' state of mind theory.

Third, the Form 14A is admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). For a memorandum or record to be admissible as a business record, it must be: (1) made by a regularly conducted business activity; (2) kept in the "regular course" of that business; (3) "the regular practice of that business to make the memorandum, and (4) made by a person with knowledge or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge." Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The Form 14A was prepared by persons with knowledge of the facts contained therein, kept in the ordinary course of Vanstar's business, and required by law to be prepared and submitted to the SEC. Moreover, Vanstar relied on the preparation of those documents in its business; it was required by law to disclose proxy and officer stock sale information. Accordingly, all of the requisites of the business records exception are satisfied. See United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1993) (documents properly admitted as business records notwithstanding defendant's objections that the circumstances surrounding preparation of documents indicated a lack of trustworthiness, and that documents were not made in regular course of business); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 126-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (firearm registration form required by law properly admitted as business record; "the person completing [the form] had knowledge of the transaction at the time it occurred and [the document] was maintained as a regularly conducted business activity as required by law."); Keogh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1983) (card dealer's diary containing personal financial records properly admitted as business record; "Witlock's diary, even though personal to him, shows every indication of being kept 'in the [ordinary] course of' his own 'business activity,' 'occupation, and calling.' . . . The reliability usually found in records kept by business concerns may be established in personal business records if they are systematically checked and regularly and continually maintained.").


Under the heightened pleading requirements of the Reform Act, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter on the part of each defendant. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§21D(b)(2), (3), 15 U.S.C. §§78 u-4(b)(2), (3). Plaintiffs attempt to meet this burden to plead the individual defendants' state of mind by arguing that those persons engaged in unusual or suspicious trading. Plaintiffs' Mem. of Points & Auth. in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 19-21. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that the actual stock sale information included in the Defendants' exhibits should not be considered.

Plaintiffs are wrong. As the Reform Act imposes an affirmative duty on plaintiffs to present a complaint that provides a strong inference of scienter, it is only logical that "plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that any such sales are in fact unusual," when they rely on stock sale allegations to plead scienter. In re Health Mgm't Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97-CIV-1865(HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8061, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1998). Thus, plaintiffs cannot merely plead their conclusion that the stock sales are "suspicious" or "unusual." Instead, they must plead information indicating (1) the number of shares and options each defendant retained, and (2) each defendants' past pattern of sales, so that the "suspicious" or "unusual" nature of the sales in question can be discerned. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§21D(b)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1), (2) (Reform Act requires plaintiffs to set forth the factual basis of allegations made on information and belief).

Thus, the Court is entitled to take judicial notice of those documents to determine if, as the Vanstar Defendants allege, they refute plaintiffs' allegations. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 751 (N.D. Cal. 1997 ("[T]he court need not accept as true allegations that contradict facts that have been judicially noticed."). Conversely, if the exhibits are not considered, neither should plaintiffs' stock sale allegations. Seee.g.Duncan v. Pencer, 1996 WL 19043, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (absent stock sale information, no inference of unusual or suspicious sales may be drawn).


For the reasons set forth above, the motion to strike should be denied in its entirety; or, if the Court is inclined to strike the Subject Documents, it should also strike plaintiffs' stock sale allegations.

Dated: October __, 1998


     Susan Bower
Attorneys for Defendants

1 Seee.g.Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056, 1064 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1998) (declining to treat Rule 12(b)(6) motion as summary judgment motion despite district court's consideration of affidavit whose "sole purpose was to put before the Court certain public records of the Department" for which court could take judicial notice); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to treat Rule 12(b)(6) motion as summary judgment motion despite district court's consideration of declaration requesting judicial notice of certain matters in public record, including other related proceedings).

2 Plaintiffs' citation to In re Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sec. Lit., No. C-89-20351, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18740 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1990), in support of their argument that the Court may not take judicial notice of the documents in question is more than a little misleading: the Court in that case declined to take judicial notice of certain SEC filings because the relevant SEC filings already were attached to the complaint by plaintiffs, and hence no judicial notice of those documents was necessary. Id. at *6. It is also curious that plaintiffs would cite Haltman v. Aura Systems, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 544, 550 (C.D. Cal. 1993), as the Court in that case merely decided that it could dismiss plaintiffs' claims without the necessity of reviewing the documents submitted for judicial notice.

3 See also In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[D]ocuments whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading may be considered in ruling [under] Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.") (quotation omitted); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 868 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993); Branch, 14 F.3d at 453 ("The leading commentators state that 'when [the] plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document as part of his pleading, [the] defendant may introduce the exhibit as part of his motion attacking the pleading.'") (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil ' 1327, at 762-63 (2d ed.1990)).

4 Plaintiffs admit that they reviewed Vanstar's SEC filings in drafting their Complaint. Complaint ¶ 160. In any event, any contention that the stock trading data alleged in the Complaint was obtained from sources other than Forms 4s is highly implausible (and no such other sources are disclosed). If Vanstar and its officers had not been required to disclose their trades and stock holdings in the SEC filings, the information would be protected from disclosure by the Article I of the California Constitution. Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 758 (the trading "allegations can be derived only from the[] publicly-filed documents," any credible financial publications themselves must derive information concerning the personal financial affairs of executives from the SEC filings).

5 Nor may plaintiffs contend that they genuinely dispute the accuracy of the exhibits at issue. The purpose of judicial notice is to avoid unnecessary costs associated with establishing a fact that "is not really disputable." 1 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 201[03] at 201-24 (1996). Courts have rejected such attempts to circumvent the principles of judicial notice. See Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 758 (rejecting theory where plaintiffs' challenge to accuracy of SEC forms submitted by the defendant was "weak," and there was no evidence presented which would cast doubt on those filings). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that judicial notice may be taken of matters less trustworthy than SEC filings, where the matter is "capable of sufficiently accurate and ready determination." In Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995), the Court held that the district court properly took judicial notice of widespread layoffs at Hughes Aircraft based on a newspaper article: "judicial notice of layoffs at Hughes was not an abuse of discretion [because] [t]his is a fact which would be generally known in Southern California and which would be capable of sufficiently accurate and ready determination." Id. at 458-59.

Source: File to epost from Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

Silverlake: Blackhawk Networks

Meet Glen Hutchins 
Founder of Silverlake Partners 
Private Equity 

Blackhawk Network
Blackhawk Network is a global financial technology company and a leader in prepaid gift, reward and incentive technologies and solutions.  Blackhawk's prepaid payments network connects more than 1,000 brands to over 244,000 retail distribution locations and online channels.

Meet Steve Burd founder on Blackhawk Networks and Former CEO of Safeway, former Southern Pacific Railroad executive 

Meet Philip Anschutz former Chairman of Southern Pacific, sold downstream assets to Enron


Silver Lake Partners buys out Blackhawk Networks while ComputerLand Employee lose their retirement?

Connecting Silver Lake Partners, William Tauscher to 500 La Gonda Way, Developer Sid Corrie, Attorney Daniel Horowitz defending Attorney William McCann then several years later the murder of Pamela Vitale wife of

Horowitz to ComputerLand corporate.   

Pete Bennett former ComputerLand programmer uncovered a spate of dubious RMAs.    

When $250,000 or more of Apple IIe came back in November 1995 by then my reports were proving something was wrong.  That was arround they disassembled the server room put it on my cubicle line where electicsal sparks began  

Bennett developed the Reports friends of former Safeway CEO Steve Burd flipped Bennett's trailer after they blew up his truck and to think I actually know CEO Steve Burd.
Oh Yeah, I forget Mainframe Designs Cabinets & Fixtures built hundreds of their End Caps, Displays, Racks and Stands plus hundreds of Coffee Displays. 

The folks at TPG will have to answer to my Whistleblower Complaints on the truly odd collection of RFPs emanating from companies connected to Richard Blum, William McGlashan, CBRE, Regency Centers, Trammel Crow, Lennar, Catellus.

My story is about witness murders, private equity, mergers and acquisitions linked back to the Matter of Bennett v. Southern Pacific lost in 1989.  It was a winnable wherese as long the witnesses testified.  



Pete Bennett former ComputerLand programmer legal documents (originals) were stolen in 2004 members of Alamo 1st Ward (Danville Stake, Oakland Temple). The Strack Family was murdered weeks after Bennett sent letters to the FBI, CPUC, City of Walnut Creek, City of San Bruno and other interested parties.  
Bennett is also a former PG&E Contract Programmer with connections to the energy sector, telecommunications plus retained as an expert witness in the matter of Keithley v. Homestore,,, National Association of Realtors over a patent case.  Bennett's 2004 proposal was pivotal in winning their case.  Represented by Alston Bird their took their win and forget to pay their witness. 
SilverLake Partners, P2 Capital Partners and executives named in this document are linked via many notable private equity transactions


1. Plaintiff brings this action against Blackhawk Network Holdings, Inc. (“Blackhawk” or the “Company”) and its Board of Directors (the “Board” or the “Individual Defendants”) for their violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78t(a), and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9, and to enjoin the vote on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Blackhawk will be acquired by Silver Lake Partners (“Silver Lake”) and P2 Capital Partners, LLC (“P2 Capital Partners,” and together with Silver Lake, the “Sponsors”), through BHN Holdings, Inc. (“Parent”) and Parent’s wholly-owned subsidiary, BHN Merger Sub, Inc. (“Merger Sub”) (the “Proposed Transaction”).

Through years of research, details hidden in the catacombs of the SEC, banking, cover-ups and plenty that are now cataloged on where Mr. Pete Bennett has chased the powerful to kidnappings, mistresses, evangelicals and Mormons can connect cases from Virginia Beach to San Francisco to Barcelona. 

About Silver Lake Partners and TPG 

Sabre Holdings to Be Acquired by TPG and Silver Lake ...
(NYSE:TSG), Silver Lake Partners and Texas Pacific Group (TPG) today announced that they have signed a definitive agreement under which Silver Lake Partners and TPG will acquire Sabre Holdings for $32.75 per share in cash. The transaction is valued at approximately $5 billion, including the assumption of approximately $550 million in net debt ...

About the Federal Bribery Case involving TPG Growth and TPG Partners 

William E. McGlashan Jr. (born November 20, 1963) is an American businessman and former international private equity investor. McGlashan founded TPG Growth[1], the growth equity and smaller buyout investment arm of TPG Capital, a global private equity investment firm.[2] He is also a founder and was the initial-CEO of The Rise Fund, a social impact fund he co-founded with Bono and Jeff Skoll.[3]
McGlashan is a co-founder and a former board member of STX Entertainment, an American film and television studio launched in 2014 with Robert Simonds,[4] and a cofounder and director of Evolution Media Capital.[5]
McGlashan was arrested March 12, 2019, after being caught on FBI audio recordings, for participating in a college admissions bribery scandal. He was then fired for cause by TPG.

  • McGlashan was a senior associate with Bain Capital and Information Partners.
  • McGlashan was active on a number of boards, including Fender Musical Instruments Corporation
  • He is also the founder of The Rise Fund, a social impact fund started by TPG Growth in partnership with Elevar Equity.[16] 


Blum Capital Partners Announces Hires

Blum Capital Partners Announces Hires

SAN FRANCISCO--()--Blum Capital Partners, a leading investment firm active in investing in both privately structured investments as well as strategic blocks of publicly traded securities, today announced that Peter Westley and Carol Fu have joined Blum Capital’s investment team as partner and associate, respectively.
“We are fortunate to have professionals as accomplished as Peter and Carol join our team”
Tweet this
Mr. Westley, 48, brings significant investment experience to Blum Capital. He was previously a Managing Director at Salomon Smith Barney and a Partner at ThinkEquity Partners. Most recently, he was a Partner at North Point Advisors, an investment banking firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions. Mr. Westley has been both an investor and financial advisor during his career, raising more than $10 billion in equity and debt capital, and advising on more than $2 billion of transactions for his clients in a variety of industries.
Mr. Westley received his MBA from the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University and BA from Dartmouth College.
“It is a privilege to be joining the firm,” said Mr. Westley. “Richard Blum’s long-term track record as a strategic financial investor is outstanding. His work as a philanthropist is equally impressive. I am also pleased to be joining Jane Su, who I have known and respected as an investor for more than 20 years. I look forward to working with Richard, Jane, and the rest of the team at Blum Capital, to take advantage of future investment opportunities on behalf of the firm’s investors.”
Ms. Fu, 28, joins Blum Capital with an extensive background in global equities. Previously, she was a senior analyst at Maverick Capital in New York City and San Francisco where she identified investment opportunities and conducted research within the industrial and energy sectors. Her experience also includes positions at Blackstone Group, Merrill Lynch and HSBC Securities, all based in Hong Kong, and at UBS in London. Ms. Fu holds a B.S. degree from the Imperial College in London, a Masters degree in Statistical Sciences from the University of Cambridge, and an MBA from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
“We are fortunate to have professionals as accomplished as Peter and Carol join our team,” said Jane Su, Co-Managing Partner at Blum Capital.
Ms. Su further noted that Blum Capital plans to continue to enhance its team of senior investment professionals in the coming months to serve both the firm’s existing investors and to expand the Blum franchise.
About Blum Capital Partners
Blum Capital Partners is a San Francisco-based public strategic block and private investment firm with approximately $1.6 billion of equity capital under management. Blum Capital Partners was founded in 1975 and has invested in a wide variety of businesses, including through multiple going-private transactions. Throughout its history, Blum has demonstrated its expertise in proactively identifying attractive businesses to own, determining the most favorable ways to invest in those businesses across the public/private spectrum and helping to drive value creation as an active, engaged partner to management teams.


Water & Wall Group
Scott Sunshine, 212-699-3672

Steven A. Burd 1949– President, chief executive officer, and chairman of the board, Safeway

Steven A. Burd

#MormonMurders - Links coming soon
#SafewayMurders -  Links coming soon

President, chief executive officer, and chairman of the board, Safeway
Nationality: American.
Born: 1949, in Valley City, North Dakota.
Education: Carroll College, BS, 1971; University of Wisconsin, MA, 1973.
Family: Married Chris (maiden name unknown); children: two.
Career: Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 1974–1982, marketer; Arthur D. Little, 1982–1987, management consultant; Safeway, 1986–1987, consultant; self-employed, 1987–1991, management consultant; Stop & Shop, 1988–1989, consultant; Fred Meyer, 1989–1990, consultant; Safeway, 1991, consultant; 1992–, president; 1993–, chief executive officer; 1998–, chairman of the board.

Address: Safeway, 5918 Stoneridge Mall Road, Pleasanton, California 94588-3229;

Nate Greenan Murdered in 2012
Ernie and Ardoth Scherer Murdered
by Ernie Scherer III (top left) with
ceremonial sword sitting Nate's hands
two years after conviction
■ Steven A. Burd was an evangelical Christian (Hillside Covenant Church) and a tough leader, a combination that puzzled his opponents but that put him in the mainstream of a movement that resulted in the election of another evangelical Christian, George W. Bush, as president of the United States in 2000; Burd was one of Bush's most prominent supporters in California. Burd's strength, and perhaps his bane, was his remarkable skill as a micromanager; he could increase sales from a store by merely rearranging the shelving on an aisle, and he could save his company money by adjusting how plastic bags were ordered.


 Burd's father was a railroad-yard superintendent, and Burd was raised primarily in Minot, North Dakota. He earned a BS in economics from Carroll College in 1971, and in 1973 he earned an MA in economics from the University of Wisconsin, after which he took a job in marketing with the Southern Pacific Transportation Company.
In 1982 Burd joined the industrial management consulting firm of Arthur D. Little in New York City, where he earned a reputation for fixing broken companies. While at Arthur D. Little he attracted the attention of the management of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, a firm that specialized in leveraged buyouts of troubled companies. In 1986 Burd worked at Safeway as a management consultant after Kohlberg Kravis Roberts bought the ailing supermarket chain. In 1987 he went into the consulting business for himself while continuing to help Safeway with its organizational problems.


In 1988 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts asked him to consult at Stop & Shop, a chain of stores that was losing its customer base. Burd helped fix the chain's problems with product selection, which had not kept up with changing consumer tastes. In 1989 he went to Oregon to help the local supermarket chain Fred Meyer. Although Burd had no official title and was technically an outsider, as the representative of the parent company, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, he found he had real muscle behind him when he ordered changes. His most significant contribution to the chain's recovery was to set up management systems to keep track of operating expenses and how supplies related to sales.
By the end of 1990 the mismanagement of Safeway was legendary, with tales of employees driven to suicide and others killed by work-related stress appearing in newspapers and magazines. Employee morale was awful, amid chronic fears of sudden, seemingly arbitrary dismissals and store closings. Safeway's prices were higher than those of its competitors, driving away customers, and it was losing money rapidly. Fresh from his two-year turnaround success at Fred Meyer, Burd was asked to consult again at Safeway.


Just a good list that will get better
Bay Area Open Mics
Bay Area Sightseeing
Bay Area Surplus
Best of Bocelli
BI Software Compared
Casino Vacation Reportss
Cell Phone Index
Cell Phone Index
When he returned to Safeway, Burd found a paranoid corporate culture, outraged labor unions, customers who felt betrayed by a chain that closed profitable local stores, and an accounting system that was so neglected that management could not know what was making money and what was not.

On October 26, 1992, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts forced Safeway's management to accept Burd as its new president. It had to have been a tough situation for Burd, because the man most widely blamed for Safeway's woes, Peter Magowan, remained chief executive officer (CEO). Magowan was supposedly Burd's superior in the governance of the company, but in terms of micromanagement Burd had few peers, and he soon made his presence felt throughout the company. The chain had 1,100 stores, mostly in the far west of the United States and in Canada. It had nine regional companies, each run independently of the others.
It took Burd years to make the nine divisions partners. He began with seemingly simple matters such as the procurement of plastic bags for bagging groceries. He found that each of the nine companies had its own individual deals with plastic-bag manufacturers, seven altogether. As he would for procurement in general, Burd centralized at corporate headquarters in Oakland, California, the ordering of plastic bags by narrowing the suppliers to two, which translated into a savings of $2.5 million per year. Burd introduced streamlined systems of cost analysis, which also resulted in savings. For example, store managers reported that in-store salad bars were earning 40 percent margins, a big boost for a company that was losing money. Yet when Burd examined the losses due to spoilage and the cost of labor to maintain the salad bars, he discovered that they were actually losing money, so he had them eliminated. For 1992 Safeway grossed $15.2 billion, and its shares sold for about $5.
On April 30, 1993, Burd was appointed CEO as well as president of Safeway, with Magowan remaining as chairman of the board but no longer involved with the day-to-day operations of the company. Burd took to visiting individual stores to study layouts, products, and even the ambient music and lighting. He began adjusting each store's produce section to suit the ethnic preferences of the neighborhood; adding, for example, more mangos in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. He was distressed by the amount of produce and other perishables that was spoiling on shelves and pressured store managers to keep their produce fresh. He introduced organic produce to Safeway, reasoning that low prices alone would not make customers loyal and that special, high-quality products could help cement consumer loyalty.

Burd succeeded at lowering shelf prices to make Safeway competitive with other supermarkets. The savings that resulted from his management reforms were used to lower prices further, remodel stores, train employees to give better service, and to introduce the Safeway Select line of premium in-house products, which became very successful at attracting and retaining customers who wanted a brand line they could trust. Although Kohlberg Kravis Roberts had reintroduced Safeway to the stock market in 1990, it still held 67 percent of the shares, and its support helped Burd's reforms stick. By the end of 1993 Safeway had achieved a 1 percent profit margin, about the industry standard, which at the time was regarded as significant evidence of Safeway's new efficiency and improved customer service. On September 7, 1993, Burd was elected to Safeway's board of directors.
In 1995 Burd began the Safeway Category Optimization Process, which considered a store's offerings aisle by aisle rather than by product category. The idea was to put products on the aisles where customers would expect to find them. In 1996 Safeway owned 35 percent of Vons, a southern California supermarket chain. Burd forced a buyout of the remaining 65 percent of shares from a reluctant Vons management. This expanded Safeway's holdings to 1,377 stores, employing 140,000 workers. Customer service improved throughout Safeway's stores, with employees remembering frequent customers by name and escorting customers to the appropriate aisles when they asked about a specific product. Insistence that employees smile at customers may have backfired when some women employees protested that their smiles elicited unwanted interest from male customers. The price per share of Safeway stock rose to $80. Burd believed that enabling employees to invest in Safeway stock was good for the financial health of both the employee and the company, and he believed shares needed to be priced low enough that employees could easily invest in them, so in 1996 he had Safeway split its shares two for one.

By 1997 one-fourth of Safeway's employees owned 15 percent of the company's stock. Burd developed a program of sending anonymous inspectors into individual Safeway stores to check on the service provided to customers. Safeway's private-label plants were selling their products to other Kohlberg Kravis Roberts chains, increasing the profits realized at each plant. Safeway's sales increased 48 percent, and the chain tried to underprice its competitors on average shelf prices. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts lowered its holding of Safeway stock to 50 percent. Safeway netted $1.3 billion in 1997, and Burd sought to use the money to acquire new stores, believing that by increasing its size Safeway would achieve an economy of scale that would allow it to survive the looming challenges of discount chains such as Wal-Mart and Target.


On May 12, 1998, Burd was elected Safeway's chairman of the board, with Magowan remaining only as a director. This was Burd's chance to fully shake loose from his predecessor. Meanwhile, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts brought its holding in Safeway down to 16 percent, meaning that Burd was largely free of their oversight, too. By October 1998 Safeway's shares were selling for $43.63 (after the split) and its financing seemed strong enough for Burd to make a daring move: In November 1998 Safeway bought Dominick's Finer Food of Illinois for $1.8 billion, consisting of cash and an assumed debt of $646 million. Dominick's had 113 stores and was a chain known for its premium products. Three years earlier the chain had been purchased for $693 million by Yucaipa Companies, owned by Los Angeles magnate Ron Burkle; the sale to Safeway was a big windfall for him, and financial analysts criticized Safeway for paying too much. Dominick's had cost Safeway about $16 million per store, compared with $11.3 million per store in the 1996 Vons deal.
Burd was sure he could turn Dominick's into a powerful asset the way he had made Safeway into one—by careful attention to details. Safeway invested $294 million into improvements at Dominick's, rearranging store layouts, widening aisles, and introducing Safeway's highly successful house brands. Dominick's employees were paid about $3 per hour more than those at local rival Jewel, owned by Albertsons, making it difficult to compete on shelf price. Burd cut staffing at Dominick's to try to lower expenses. The initial results were not good. Customers were unhappy that comfortable old layouts had been replaced by Safeway's open configuration and that Safeway brands had replaced premium name brands. For three consecutive years Dominick's income declined, and its regional market-share fell from 28 percent to 23 percent. To be fair to Burd, high-quality Safeway brands had achieved margins as high as 30 percent in the Vons chain as well as at other Safeway stores, giving reason to expect them to find appreciative buyers in Illinois.
In 1999 Safeway purchased Randall's Food Markets of Texas. To realize quick savings, Safeway reduced the chain's product selection and, as at Dominick's, introduced its house brands to customers unfamiliar with them. At both Dominick's and Randall's understaffing caused long lines at checkout registers, angering customers and lowering employee morale. Burd had long believed that high employee morale would result in better customer service, and he believed Safeway could excel in customer service, making its stores more attractive to shoppers than those of competitors, so the decline in morale was to him a serious problem.
Burd believed that a key asset was store location—placing stores where they were most convenient for shoppers. Thus, he was always looking for ideal store locations. In May 2000, for example, Safeway bought six stores in Houston from Albertsons because they seemed well placed. Burd's aggressive moves to acquire more stores created excitement among investors and journalists, and by 2001 rumors were rife about what his next moves would be. That year Safeway's stock peaked at a little over $60 per share, an increase in value of $10 billion since 1993. The chain's sales had doubled since 1993, and the profit margin was 4 percent, a big increase over 1993.
In February 2001 Safeway bought 11 stores in Arizona from Abco Foods, then purchased the Genuardi's Family Markets supermarket chain in Pennsylvania for $528 million. Genuardi's had 44 stores. Thereafter Genuardi's developed a reputation for poorly stocked shelves and poor produce. Burd viewed Safeway's advantages as location, selection, perishables, and service, but market forces were turning against him. In October 2001 United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) members struck three Safeway stores in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. Burd said that Safeway had to contain its labor costs in order to compete with challenges from discount chains, and he threatened to close the stores rather than give in. In June 2002, after months of negotiations, he did just that.
In 2002 Safeway took over $1.2 billion in write downs (admitting the value of assets had gone down), a $589 million charge on Dominick's in April (taking a loss in value), and a $788 million charge on Dominick's again in November 2002. In November 2002 Safeway put Dominick's up for sale. Safeway's books valued Dominick's at only $315 million. Ron Burkle's Yucaipa Companies offered Safeway $350 million to buy back Dominick's, but Safeway turned him down; Burkle said he felt slighted by Safeway. In August 2003 Safeway sued Burkle for interfering in negotiations with Dominick's union, costing Safeway a purchaser for the chain because the purchaser could not reach an agreement with the union. Increases in costs of meat and dairy products further hurt Safeway's bottom line, because in a low-inflation economy it would have a hard time justifying increases in prices to its shoppers. Meanwhile, conditions at Genuardi's had deteriorated so badly that Safeway ran newspaper ads apologizing to customers and asking them to forgive Safeway and to try shopping at Genuardi's stores again. For 2002 Safeway grossed $35.7 billion, but it lost $828 million.


Events in 2003-2004 almost cost Burd his career and Safeway its financial strength. Wal-Mart announced that it would open 40 supercenters—stores that sold a full line of groceries as well as Wal-Mart's other offerings—in California. Discount chains in general, but Wal-Mart in particular, worried Burd and other supermarket leaders because they could significantly underprice traditional supermarkets. The biggest advantage for Wal-Mart seemed to be in the cost of labor. Wal-Mart employees were paid on average about $8 per hour less than Safeway employees and received few benefits, whereas Safeway's employees enjoyed some of the best benefits for retail workers anywhere in the country. The charge by the federal government in 2003 that Wal-Mart employed illegal immigrants who received no benefits only heightened the anxiety Wal-Mart caused its competitors.
Burd said that labor costs were a threat to the supermarket industry's survival, that high wages and benefits made it impossible for the chains to compete with Wal-Mart and Target, which were nonunion. On October 11, 2003, the UFCW went on strike against Safeway's Vons stores in southern California. Vons had 326 stores and generated 19 percent of Safeway's sales. In support of Safeway, Albertsons and Ralph's, which was owned by Kroger Company, locked out UFCW workers. Union leaders said they chose to strike only Vons because Vons would have the toughest negotiators. The three supermarket chains made Burd their spokesperson. Mindful of his belief that employee morale translated into customer service, Burd moved to mitigate some of the hardships of striking Vons workers by setting up a fund to aid workers with mortgage bills, car payments, and other expenses, hoping to alleviate the hard feelings that would result from a strike. On October 16, 2003, Burd said the three supermarket chains had made their final offer to the union, declaring that the only changes that could be made to the offer would be to make it "less good" (, October 26, 2003). Burd wanted to cut Safeway's contributions to health care from $3.85 per hour worked to $1.35 per hour worked. For its part, the UFCW feared that Safeway could set a precedent that would affect contract negotiations throughout the United States.

Safeway's share price fell to $22 on October 24, 2003, which was still much higher than it had been in 1993. While Burd talked publicly about the long-term future of the industry and labor costs, he was working on revolutionary changes in how the supermarket industry dealt with vendors. For decades supermarket chains charged vendors for shelf space and shelf position; that is, in order to have its products placed in a good position on stores shelves, the vendor would pay the chain in cash. In 2003 Burd was reworking, in his typically meticulous fashion, the relationship between Safeway and vendors, demanding not cash for product placement, but price concessions. He saw Safeway's future in buying products for the lowest real-market value and then passing on the lowered prices to consumers. The prices might not beat those of discount chains, but they could be low enough that with superior products and service Safeway would attract customers away from Wal-Mart and its ilk. Further, he started having stores remodeled to be more comfortable for shoppers, installing imitation wood floors and softer lighting, for example. Market studies had indicated that shoppers found Wal-Mart stores chaotic and anxious; Burd sought to make Safeway's stores welcoming and calming. For 2003 Safeway grossed $35.6 billion but lost $170 million, failing to make a profit because it lost $696 million in the fourth quarter of the year, mostly due to lost revenue from its Vons stores.

The West Coast leader of the UFCW was Sean Harrigan, a friend whom Burkle had helped become president of the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). In March 2004 CalPERS and the pension funds of New York, Illinois, and Connecticut, each owning shares in Safeway, urged fellow shareholders to oppose Burd during the May 20, 2004, meeting of shareholders. A few financial analysts recommended that their clients vote to oust Burd. In January 2004 about 250 demonstrators tried to march to Burd's home but were stopped by the gates and guards. They prayed and called Burd evil. He was vilified in the press and on Web sites for being greedy, for costing shareholders $20 billion in stock value during a decline since 2001, and for abusing the rights of employees.
The southern California strike was settled in February 2004 in an arbitrated compromise that left workers with wages and benefits higher than in other retail businesses. Safeway's stock value was increasing, to over $28 per share. Shareholders complained that Safeway's board of directors lacked independence and profited from doing business with Safeway. Thus, the board dismissed three directors. Burd and two other longtime directors from the 1980s were targeted in the shareholders meeting, but each was reelected with over 80 percent of the vote. A proposition to separate the offices of CEO and chairman of the board received only 33.2 percent of the vote. Even so, a new position of lead independent director was created to help look after the interests of shareholders.
See also entry on Safeway Inc. in International Directory of Company Histories .

sources for further information

Barron, Kelly, "The Sam Walton of Supermarkets?" Forbes , October 19, 1998, pp. 64–65.
Green, Frank, "The Point Man," , October 26, 2003, .
Weinstein, Steve, "The Resurrection of Safeway," Progressive Grocer , January 1997, pp. 16–22.
Whelan, David, "Unsafe at Safeway," Forbes , June 7, 2004, pp. 66–68.
—Kirk H. Beetz

Read more:

Anchor links for post titles

Popular Posts

Blog Archive


Recent Posts

Popular Posts


Recent Posts



Blog Archive

Recent Posts